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ABSTRACT
Social media encourages user participation and facilitates user’s self-expression like
never before. While enriching user behavior in a spectrum of means, many social media
platforms have become breeding grounds for user misbehavior. In this dissertation we
focus on understanding and combating three specific threads of user misbehaviors that
widely exist on social media — spamming, manipulation, and distortion.
First, we address the challenge of detecting spam links. Rather than rely on traditional
blacklist-based or content-based methods, we examine the behavioral factors of both who
is posting the link and who is clicking on the link. The core intuition is that these behav-
ioral signals may be more difficult to manipulate than traditional signals. We find that this
purely behavioral approach can achieve good performance for robust behavior-based spam
link detection.
Next, we deal with uncovering manipulated behavior of link sharing. We propose a
four-phase approach to model, identify, characterize, and classify organic and organized
groups who engage in link sharing. The key motivating insight is that group-level behav-
ioral signals can distinguish manipulated user groups. We find that levels of organized
behavior vary by link type and that the proposed approach achieves good performance
measured by commonly-used metrics.
Finally, we investigate a particular distortion behavior: making bullshit (BS) state-
ments on social media. We explore the factors impacting the perception of BS and what
leads users to ultimately perceive and call a post BS. We begin by preparing a crowd-
sourced collection of real social media posts that have been called BS. We then build a
classification model that can determine what posts are more likely to be called BS. Our
experiments suggest our classifier has the potential of leveraging linguistic cues for detect-
ii
ing social media posts that are likely to be called BS.
We complement these three studies with a cross-cutting investigation of learning user
topical profiles, which can shed light into what subjects each user is associated with, which
can benefit the understanding of the connection between user and misbehavior. Concretely,
we propose a unified model for learning user topical profiles that simultaneously considers
multiple footprints and we show how these footprints can be embedded in a generalized
optimization framework.
Through extensive experiments on millions of real social media posts, we find our
proposed models can effectively combat user misbehavior on social media.
iii
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
The cornerstone of social media is user-generated behavioral activity. For example,
users power these systems by sharing content, commenting, messaging, befriending, and
engaging in among many other behaviors. This behavioral activity implicitly reveals user
preferences, interests, and relationships (e.g., Youtube users vote “like” or “dislike” for
a video; Twitter users retweet or mention other’s tweets), which can play an important
role in a variety of applications. For example, for social media service providers, by
understanding how their users behave in the system, they can improve their system’s per-
sonalization module to enhance user experience. For online marketers, they can exploit
user’s preference and interaction patterns to spread their content quickly and widely [1].
For Internet service providers, learning traffic patterns on social media websites can guide
traffic optimization in their infrastructures [2].
While facilitating user’s self-expression and information spread like never before [3,
4], many social media platforms have also become major breeding grounds for user mis-
behavior. These misbehaviors lead to a big volume of misinformation on social media
such as spam [5, 6], fraud [7, 8], and rumors [9, 10], which may result in several levels of
damage to user experience and even society. For example, spammers on Facebook send
victims unsolicited requests and messages many of which include links to commercial ads,
phishing websites, or malware [6, 11, 12]. Fake accounts on Yelp purposely post deceptive
reviews to mislead potential customers due to profit or fame [13, 14]. It has been observed
that abusive behaviors on Twitter have considerable influence on the outcome of political
campaigns [15, 16, 17]. And rumors that are deliberately spread during mass emergencies
and disasters (e.g., Hurricane Sandy in 2012 and Boston Marathon bombing in 2013), can
1
cause anxiety, panic, and insecurity to the whole society [8, 9, 18].
In this dissertation we focus on understanding and combating three specific threads
of user misbehavior that widely exist on social media — spamming, manipulation, and
distortion (see Figure 1.1). And toward combating these misbehaviors, we investigate one
specific important application for each misbehavior as follows:
• Misbehavior 1: Spamming. First, we address the problem of detecting spam links
(URLs). Link sharing is a core attraction of many existing social media systems like
Twitter and Facebook. Recent studies find that around 25% of all status messages
in these systems contain links [19, 20], amounting to millions of links shared per
day. With this opportunity comes challenges, however, from malicious users who
share spam links to promote ads, phishing, malware, and other low-quality content.
Those spamming behaviors ultimately degrade the quality of information available
in these systems. Several recent efforts have identified the problem of spam links on
the Web [21, 22, 23], but it has not been fully explored particularly on social media.
• Misbehavior 2: Manipulation. Next, we take a step further from individual spam-
ming behavior, and are interested in uncovering manipulated behavior of coordina-
tion in link sharing. While some link sharing is organic, other sharing is strategically
organized with a common (perhaps, nefarious) purpose, such as campaign-like ad-
vertising and other adversarial propaganda. These manipulated campaigns conduct
fraudulent activities, which can wreck havoc on business, politics, and social secu-
rity [24, 25, 26, 27]. To purify and improve the information quality on social media,
it becomes imperative that the service providers can detect those manipulated be-
haviors of link sharing.
• Misbehavior 3: Distortion. Finally, we investigate one concrete distortion behavior
that widely exists on social media — making bullshit (BS) statements. We follow the
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concept of BS by philosopher Harry Frankfurt: BS is a statement that does not ad-
dress facts, but rather distorts what the BS-er is up to [28, 29]. The current ecosystem
of online social media has made it trivial to spread distorted information without ac-
countability, accelerating the production of BS. Some BS statement on social media
can increase stress and fear, which often leads to real-world violence [30]. More-
over, it has been observed that BS has reached issues like politics and advertising
where it can actually cause severe problems for BS-receivers [17, 31].
Figure 1.1: An overview of all problems studied in this dissertation
1.2 Research Challenges
While investigating these three types of user behavior is important, there are significant
research gaps toward modeling and solving them efficiently and effectively. Here, we
identify several main research challenges:
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• Defining Misbehavior: Detecting user misbehavior on social media has not been
fully explored so that many relevant problems are not clearly formulated. For exam-
ple, when studying manipulation in link sharing, the definition of organized behav-
ioral pattern is unsettled, e.g., how to mathematically define organic behavior and
organized behavior in the context of link sharing? This issue becomes even more
obvious in the problem of BS detection. How to adapt the concept of bullshit in phi-
losophy or linguistics and properly define BS within the scope of social media? How
to formulate a model of automatic BS detection in social media? All the problem
formulations need to be resolved before solutions are figured out.
• Distinguishing Misbehavior from Legitimate Behavior: Considering the massive
noise on social media, it becomes extremely challenging to clearly distinguish the
trails of user misbehavior, even for human judgment. For example, to evaluate the
distortion in a post, we need to find out whether the poster cares if his post is true
or not. Yet, it is unrealistic to fully mine a user’s intent of distortion — we will
never truly know what a user thinks when he posts. In the problem of detecting
manipulated link sharing, the difference between the two extremes — organic and
organized — is often not a simple distinction. Those “good intriguers” try hard to
disguise themselves, which makes effectively differentiating them a tricky job.
• Uncovering Behavioral Signals: Behavioral signals have historically been difficult
to collect. Many online social media systems provide restricted (or even no) re-
search access (like public API) to posts published on them, such as Facebook and
Instagram. Even for those systems that do provide a sample of its posts (like Twit-
ter), it is still hard to collect fine-grained behavioral signals. For instance, in the
problem of spam link detection, we do not know how those links posted on social
media are actually received by the users via clicks. As a result, much insight into be-
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havioral patterns of link sharing has been limited to proprietary and non-repeatable
studies.
1.3 Contributions of This Dissertation
Keeping those research challenges in mind, in this dissertation we aim for developing
novel computational models toward discovering, formulating, modeling, and solving those
problems introduced in Section 1.1. In particular, we first turn in this section to describe
our contributions toward each of those three misbehavior-related applications. Then, we
introduce a fourth problem we are going to study, serving as a cross-cutting component
that supports better understandings of the other three tasks shown in Figure 1.1.
1.3.1 Detecting Spam Links via Behavioral Analysis
We investigate the potential of behavioral analysis for uncovering which links are spam
and which are not. By behavioral signals, we are interested both in the aggregate behavior
of who is posting these links in social systems and who is clicking on these links once they
have been posted. These behavioral signals offer the potential of rich contextual evidence
about each link that goes beyond traditional spam detection methods that rely on blacklists,
the content of the link, its in-links, or other link-related metadata.
Concretely, we propose and evaluate fifteen click and posting-based behavioral fea-
tures, including: for postings — how often the link is posted, the frequency dispersion of
when the link is posted (e.g., is it posted only on a single day in a burst? or is it diffusely
posted over a long period?), and the social network of the posters themselves; and for
clicks — we model the click dynamics of each link (e.g., does it rapidly rise in popular-
ity? are there multiple spikes in popularity?) and consider several click-related statistics
about each link, including the total number of clicks accumulated and the average clicks
per day that a link was actually clicked. We accommodate these behavioral signals into a
classification model to automatically detect spam links.
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Through extensive experimental study over a dataset of 7 million Bitly-shortened links
posted to Twitter, we find that these behavioral signals provide overlapping but fundamen-
tally different perspectives on links. Through this purely behavioral approach for spam
link detection, we can achieve high precision (0.86), recall (0.86), and area-under-the-
curve (0.92). Compared to many existing methods that focus on either the content of social
media posts or the destination page — which may be easily manipulated by spammers to
evade detection — this behavior-based approach suggests the potential of leveraging these
newly-available behavioral cues for robust, on-going spam detection.
1.3.2 Revealing Organized Link Sharing Behavior
In the context of manipulated link sharing on social media, we investigate a method
to automatically (i) identify user groups in terms of similar link sharing behaviors; and
(ii) differentiate strategically organized and genuinely organic user groups, through the
development of a link sharing behavior based model. The key insight is that the publicly
available link sharing information can help model users with similar behaviors of link
sharing, and that some group-level behavioral signals can help characterize whether the
behaviors of a group of users are organic or organized.
Concretely, we propose a four-step approach. We first formulate the behavior of link
sharing based on its three key factors: user, link, and the posting activity. Based upon
such a model, we design a similarity measurement of user behaviors in link sharing. Then,
given the pairwise similarity function, we build a user graph model from which we iden-
tify user groups each of which contains users with similar link sharing behaviors. Next, on
the group level, we characterize the organic and organized user groups based on the link
posting behaviors of their members. Finally, we embed those characteristics into a classi-
fication framework to systematically distinguish organic and organized groups of users.
We test our approach on four different classification algorithms and in most cases it
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performs well in terms of precision, recall, F-measure, and ROC area. Random Forest
algorithm works best with 0.921 ROC. Our experimental analysis demonstrated the capa-
bility of our approach for (i) understanding users with similar link sharing behaviors; and
(ii) distinguishing the level of manipulated user misbehaviors in link sharing.
1.3.3 Identifying BS on Social Media
We seek for footprints of human judgments left by other social media users to help
locate potential BS posts, and we focus on the replying behavior as the evidence of a “BS
call”. BS can originate from anywhere (i.e. many users post BS; no user posts only BS),
which makes it very difficult to identify. The volume of potential BS and other noise
on social media make this problem even trickier. We choose replying behavior because
replies can help us easily track who and what have been called BS. Also, replies are often
topically motivated, meaning repliers care about the content of the post as opposed to other
factors (e.g. author of the post) [32].
Instead of diving into the extremely nuanced task of detecting “actual” BS, we build a
model that can automatically determine what social media posts are likely to be called BS.
There is a gap between BS-called posts and actual BS posts — we have observed many
real examples showing identifying BS is a challenging task, even for humans. We focus on
the audience’s perception of BS. We do this by mining how the audience perceives poster’s
intent of BS-ing through signals from the post itself. Our work can serve as a stepping-
stone to the ultimate goal of BS detection. For instance, our results can be used to filter
posts that are unlikely to be BS from the vast social media stream. This could provide a
more narrow search-space to develop a true BS identification method.
In concrete, we first prepare a curated crowd-sourced collection of BS-called tweets
gathered over a sequence of 100 consecutive days. Next, we identify four factors within a
post that influence a reader’s perception: attitude, sentiment, sincerity, and content. This
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characterization leads to a classification model to differentiate between posts that are more
likely to be called BS and posts that are less likely to be called BS. Finally, we conduct
a series of experiments showing our model is capable of leveraging linguistic cues for
identifying posts are likely to be called BS, suggesting the great potential of a preliminary
BS auto-filter on social media.
1.3.4 A Cross-cutting Component: Learning User Topical Profile
Each of those three applications mentioned above has its own scope in the context of
user misbehavior, but they all connect to the user who is the cross-cutting subject. This
triggers an important question — who are those users? Answering this question can shed
light into what subjects each user is associated with, which can serve as an important cross-
cutting component toward better understanding the mutual relationship between users and
the misbehaviors they commit. For example, we can analyze a user’s “morality” on so-
cial media based on his behaviors; and judging a user “good” or “bad” can guide further
investigations on this user’s behaviors on social media.
Therefore, we study a fourth task of learning social media user’s topical profile — top-
ical interests (i.e., what she likes) or expertise (i.e., what she is known for). On the one
hand, those users who are learned to have “problematic” topical profiles are suspicious
targets of misbehaviors. On the other hand, those who associate with “high-profiles” (like
experts with enormous reputation in certain domain) tend to keep distance from noxious
behavior. For instance, if we find a group of Twitter accounts whose topical profiles are
highly similar and all associate with spam, it becomes wary that these accounts are likely to
conduct manipulated spamming behaviors. If a Facebook user posts extensively on topics
that are distant from the domain of his real expertise (e.g., a sports journalist makes volu-
minous claims on politics), it hints that this user is probably BS-ing. Besides, in general,
the problem of learning a user’s topical profile also has its own important applications in
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many domains. It can improve user experience and powering important applications like
personalized web search [33], recommendation system [34, 35], expert mining [36], and
community detection [37].
We propose to exploit heterogeneous footprints (e.g., tags, friends, interests, behavior)
for intelligently learning user topical profiles. Based on a small set of explicit user tags,
our goal is to extend this known set to the wider space of users who have no explicit
tags. The key intuition is to identify “similar” users in terms of their topical profiles by
exploiting their similarity in a footprint space. For instance, Twitter users who post similar
hashtags may have similar interests, and YouTube users who upvote the same videos may
have similar preferences. Such evidence of homophily has been widely studied in the
sociological literature [38] and repeatedly observed in online social media, e.g., [39, 40,
41, 42, 43].
In a summary, we make four main contributions toward learning user topical profile
on social media. First, we formulate the problem of learning user topical profiles in social
media, with a focus on leveraging heterogeneous footprints. Second, we demonstrate how
to model different footprints (e.g., like interests, social, and behavioral footprints) under
this framework, and we present a unified 2-D factorization model in which we simultane-
ously consider all of these footprints. Third, we then extend this initial approach through
a generalized model that integrates the pairwise relations across all potential footprints via
a tensor-based model, which provides a more robust framework for user profile learning.
Finally, through extensive experiments, we find the proposed model is capable of learning
high-quality user topical profiles, and leads to a 10-15% improvement in precision and
mean average error versus a state-of-the-art baseline. We find that behavioral footprints
are the single strongest factor, but that intelligent integration of multiple footprints leads
to the best overall performance.
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1.4 Structure of This Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:
• Section 2 — we explore the problem of detecting spam links via behavioral analy-
sis. We first give the problem statement and setup. Then we provide posting-based
features and click-based features toward building a classification model of spam link
detection. Finally we present extensive experiment results.
• Section 3 — we investigate the problem of revealing organized link sharing behav-
ior. We present our four-stage approach step by step: (1) modeling the behavior of
link sharing, (2) extracting user groups with similar behavioral patterns, (3) charac-
terizing organic and organized groups based on group-level behavioral signals, and
(4) embedding extracted features into a classification framework.
• Section 4 — we look into the problem identifying BS on social media. We first
introduce our motivation and methodology of data collection. We then formulate
the problem and explain four factors impacting the likelihood a post gets called BS.
In the end we present experiment analysis on our dataset and a classification model
detecting social media posts that are likely called BS.
• Section 5 — we propose a generalized framework for learning user topical profiles.
After providing preliminaries including all notations and problem definition, we first
identify multiple implicit footprints and demonstrate how to model them. We then
introduce a matrix-factorization-based approach, before extending this version to a
more general tensor-based approach.
• Section 6 — We conclude with a summary of contributions made by this dissertation
research. We discuss several potential directions of future extension to the results
presented in this dissertation.
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2. COMBATING SPAMMING: DETECTING SPAM LINKS VIA BEHAVIORAL
ANALYSIS∗
In this section we explore the problem of detecting spam links via behavioral analysis,
as a specific application toward tackling the first misbehavior — spamming. We begin
with the introduction and related work, followed by problem setup and details of our so-
lution. In the end we report a series of experiments designed to evaluate the quality of the
proposed solution.
2.1 Introduction
Link sharing is one of the key functions in most existing social media systems. In the
early days of Twitter in 2007, Java et al. already saw that about 13% of a collection of 1.3
million tweets included a link [44]. Recent studies have confirmed the ongoing popularity
of link sharing on Twitter. In 2010, Boyd et al. found 22% of a sample of 720,000 tweets
included a link [45]. And in 2011, Rodrigues et al. found that nearly a quarter of 1.7
billion tweets contained links [19].
With the popularity of link sharing comes challenges, however, from malicious user
behaviors of spreading phishing, malware, and other spam content. Indeed, several recent
efforts have identified the problem of spam links in social media [46, 22, 23, 47], which
ultimately deteriorates the information quality in these systems. Defending social media
systems from spam links is important for shielding unsuspecting social media users from
these threats.
Our goal is to investigate the potential of behavioral analysis for uncovering which
∗Part of this section is reprinted with permission from "Detecting Spam URLs in Social Media via Be-
havioral Analysis" by Cao C., Caverlee J. (2015) In: Hanbury A., Kazai G., Rauber A., Fuhr N. (eds)
Advances in Information Retrieval. ECIR 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9022. Springer,
Cham. Copyright 2015 by Springer.
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links are spam and which are not. By behavioral signals, we are interested both in the
aggregate behavior of who is posting these links on social media and who is clicking on
these links once they have been posted. These behavioral signals offer the potential of rich
contextual evidence about each link that goes beyond traditional detection methods that
rely on blacklists, the content in the link, its in-links, or other link-related metadata.
Unfortunately, it has historically been difficult to investigate behavioral patterns of
posts and clicks. First, many social media platforms provide restricted (or even no) access
to posts, like Facebook. Second, even for those systems that do provide research access to a
sample of its posts (like Twitter), it has been difficult to assess how these links are actually
received by the users of the system via clicks. As a result, much insight into behavioral
patterns of link sharing has been limited to proprietary and non-repeatable studies.
Hence, we begin a behavioral examination of spam link detection through two dis-
tinct perspectives (see Figure 2.1): (i) the first is via a study of how these links are posted
through publicly-accessible Twitter data; (ii) the second is via a study of how these links
are received by measuring their click patterns through the publicly-accessible Bitly click
API. Concretely, we propose and evaluate fifteen click-based and posting-based behav-
ioral features. For posting we are interested in how often a link is posted, the frequency
dispersion of when the link is posted (e.g., is it posted only on a single day in a burst? or is
it diffusely posted over a long period?), and the social network of the posters themselves.
And for click, we model the click dynamics of each link (e.g., does it rapidly rise in popu-
larity? are there multiple spikes in popularity?) and consider several click-related statistics
about each link — including the total number of clicks accumulated and the average clicks
per day that a link was actually clicked.
Through extensive experimental study over a dataset of 7 million Bitly-shortened links
posted to Twitter, we find that these behavioral signals provide overlapping but fundamen-
tally different perspectives on links. Through this purely behavioral approach for spam
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Figure 2.1: Studying spam link detection in social media from two perspectives: (i) Post-
ing behavior (left); (ii) Click behavior (right)
link detection, we can achieve high precision (0.86), recall (0.86), and area-under-the-
curve (0.92). Compared to many existing methods that focus on either the content of social
media posts or the destination page – which may be easily manipulated by spammers to
evade detection – this behavior-based approach suggests the potential of leveraging these
newly-available behavioral cues for robust, on-going spam detection.
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2.2 Related Work
Links (and in particular, shortened links) have been widely shared on social media
systems in recent years. Antoniades et al. [46] conducted the first comprehensive analysis
of short links in which they investigated usage-related properties such as life span. With
the rising concern of short links as a way to conceal untrustworthy web destinations, there
have been a series of studies focused on security concerns of these links, including: a study
of phishing attacks through short links [22], geographical analysis of spam short links via
usage logs [23], an examination of security and privacy risks introduced in shortening
services [47], and a long-term observation of shortening services on security threats [48].
Separately, Twitter spam detection has been widely studied in recent years. In general,
three types of approaches have been proposed: user profile based, content based, and
network relation based. User profile based methods [49, 50, 51] build classifiers using
features extracted from account profiles, e.g., profile longevity. Content-based features
[52, 51] focus on the posting text. Network-based features [53, 54, 55] are those extracted
from the social graph such as clustering coefficient. A couple of detection systems of
suspicious links on Web have been developed. Some of these [56, 57, 58, 59] directly
use URL’s lexical features, redirecting patterns, and link’s metadata such as IP and DNS
information. Some [60, 61] consider features extracted from the HTML content of the
landing page. Additionally, several dynamic spam link filtering systems have also been
developed [62, 63, 64].
Several recent works have used clicks extracted from the Bitly API, typically to study
the properties of known spam links. For example, Grier et al. [52] recovered clicking
statistics of blacklisted Bitly links, with the aim of measuring the success of those spam
links on Twitter. Maggi et al. [48] submitted malicious long links to the Bitly API in order
to examine the performance in terms of spam pre-filtering. Chhabra et al. [22] shortened a
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set of known phishing long links and analyzed factors like the referrer and location. There
recently has been some research on using proprietary server-side click log data to defend
against some types of spam (e.g., [65, 66]). In contrast, our aim is to investigate how
large-scale publicly-available click-based information may be used as behavioral signals
in the context of spam link detection on social media.
2.3 Behavior-based Spam Link Detection
In this section, we investigate a series of behavioral-based features for determining
whether a link shared in social media is spam or not. We view this problem as a binary
classification problem. For both the posting-based and click-based perspectives, we are
interested to explore questions like: What meaningful patterns can we extract from these
publicly-available resources? Are posting or click-based features more helpful for spam
link detection? And which specific features are most informative?
2.3.1 Problem Statement and Setup
Given a link v that has been shared on a social media platform, the behavior-based
spam link detection problem is to predict whether v is a spam link through a classifier
c : v → {spam, benign}, based only on behavioral features. We consider two types of be-
havioral features associated with each link – a set of posting-related behavioral features Fp
and a set of click-based behavioral features Fc. Such a behavior-based approach requires
both a collection of links that have been shared, as well as the clicks associated with each
link. Since many social media platforms (like Facebook) place fairly stringent limits on
crawling, we targeted Bitly-shortened links.
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(a) Postings
(b) Clicks
Figure 2.2: Distribution of postings and clicks for the sampled dataset.
Postings. Concretely, we first used the Twitter public streaming API to sample tweets
during January 2013. We collected only tweets containing at least one Bitly link (that is, a
complete link that had been shortened using the Bitly link shortening service). In total, we
collected 13.7 million tweets containing 7.29 million unique Bitly-shortened links. We see
in Figure 2.2a the typical “long tail” distribution: a few links have been posted upwards of
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100,000 times, whereas most have been posted once or twice.
Clicks. We accessed the Bitly API to gather fine-grained click data about each of the 7.29
million links. For example, we can extract the number of clicks per time unit (e.g., minute,
hour, day, month) and by country of origin. In total, we find that nearly all – 7.27 million
out of 7.29 million – of the links have valid click information, and that 3.6 million (49.5%)
of the links were clicked at least once during our study focus (January 2013). As in the
case of postings, we find a “long tail” distribution in clicks, as seen in Figure 2.2b.
2.3.2 Posting-based Features
In the first perspective, we aim to study the links through the posting behaviors as-
sociated with them. For example, some links are posted by a single account and at a
single time. Others may be posted frequently by a single account, or by many accounts.
Similarly, links may be temporally “bursty” in their posting times are spread more evenly
across time. Our goal in this section is to highlight several features that may describe each
link based on its posting behavior.
Posting Count. The first feature of posting behavior is the total number of times a link
has been posted on Twitter during our study window. Our intuition is that this count
can provide an implicit signal of the topic of the link destination as well as the intent of
the sharer: e.g., links that are posted only a few times may indicate more personal, or
localized interest. We formulate this feature as posting count, denoted as PostCount(u)
given a short link u.
Posting Standard Deviation. A Weather Channel link and a CNN breaking news link
may have a similar posting count on Twitter. However, the Weather Channel link may be
posted every day of the month (linking to a routine daily forecast), whereas a breaking
news link may be posted in a burst of activity in a single day. To capture this posting
concentration, we consider the standard deviation of the days in which a link is posted.
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Concretely, for each link u we have a list of days when u was posted. We refer to this list
as u’s posting days, denoted by PostDays(u). We define the posting standard deviation
of a link u as the standard deviation of all elements in PostDays(u), denoted as std(u).
For example, if a link u was posted 10 times on January 22nd and not tweeted on any other
day, we have std(u) = 0. On the contrary, a link u shared once per day will have a much
larger std(u).
Posting Intensity. The posting standard deviation gives insight into how concentrated a
link has been posted, but it does not capture the total intensity of the posting. For example,
two links both of which have only one single posting day will have the same posting
standard deviation, even if one was posted thousands of times while the other appeared
only once. To capture this difference, we introduce posting intensity to capture how intense
the posting behaviors of a link are. Given a link u, we calculate u’s “intensity score” via:
intensity(u) =
PostCount(u)
(std(u) ∗ |set(PostDays(u))|) + 1
where |set(PostDays(u))| is the number of distinct posting days of u. For those links
whose scores are the highest, they have high posting frequency, but also a low intensity of
posting days. To illustrate, we find in our dataset that the link with the highest intensity
score was posted nearly 30,000 times on a single day.
Posting User Network. The sharer’s personal network and reputation have certain con-
nection with what and why she posts. A typical example is the comparison between
celebrities and spammers. Spammers whose networks commonly are sparse tend to post
spam links to advertise, whereas a celebrity may not share such low-quality links. Thus,
for each link we consider features capturing the poster’s personal network. Here, we use
the counts of followers and friends as simple proxies for user popularity, and take the
median among all posters.
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2.3.3 Click-based Features
Now we turn our attention to how links are received in social media by considering the
clicks that are associated with each link in our dataset. We consider two kinds of click-
ing patterns: clicking timeline features that consider the temporal series of daily received
clicks, and clicking statistics features that capture overall statistics of the clicks.
For the first kind of clicking pattern, we have every short link’s fine-grained daily
clicking data – which we can plot as its clicking timeline. We adopt three features extracted
from this clicking timeline curve:
Rises + Falls. The first question we are interested is: how to capture the overall shape of
a link’s clicks – do some go up continuously? Or do some periodically go up and down?
To measure these changes, let ni denote the number of clicks on the ith day. We define
a rise if there exists an i such that ni+1 − ni > α ∗ ni where α is a threshold. We set it
to be 0.1, ensuring the change is non-trivial. Based on this criteria, we observe eight rises
in Figure 2.3b (some are quite small). Similarly, let ni denote the number of clicks on the
ith day. We define a fall if there exists an i such that ni − ni−1 > β ∗ ni−1 where β is a
threshold value (set to 0.1 in our experiments). We observe eleven falls in Figure 2.3b.
Spikes + Troughs. In Figure 2.3b, we observe that while there are eight rises, there are
only five spikes of interest. So rather than capturing consecutive monotonic changes (as in
the rises and falls), we additionally measure the degree of fluctuation of a link through its
spikes and troughs. That is, if there is an i such that ni−1 < ni > ni+1 we call it a spike.
If there exists an i satisfying ni−1 > ni < ni+1, then we define it is a trough. To illustrate,
Figure 2.3b has 5 spikes and 3 troughs.
Peak Difference. Naturally, there is a relationship between how and when a link is posted
and the clicks the link receives. For example, Figure 2.3a illustrates a close relationship be-
tween posting and clicking for a link. In contrast, Figure 2.3b demonstrates a much looser
19
(a)
(b)
Figure 2.3: The click and post timelines for two links. In (a), post and click behaviors are
tightly coupled. In (b), the relationship is more relaxed.
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connection, indicating some external interest in the link beyond just its Twitter postings (in
this case, the link refers to a university website which attracts attention from many sources
beyond Bitly-shortened links on Twitter). To capture the extent to which posting behaviors
influence clicks, we define the peak difference. For each link, we identify its clicking peak
as the day it received the most clicks. Similarly, we identify its posting peak as the day it
was posted the most. Note that a link may have more than one posting peak and clicking
peak. Here we define the peak difference as the minimum difference between two peaks
among all pairs. The range of peak difference is from 0 to 30. In this way, peak difference
can represent the level of tightness between clicking and posting.
We augment these timeline-based features with several click statistics:
Total Clicks. The first statistic is the total clicks a link received in the period of study,
which is a clear indicator of the popularity of a link.
Average Clicks. Given a link’s total clicks and posting count, we can measure its average
clicks per posting. By intuition more exposures bring more clicking traffic, but the aver-
age clicks is not necessarily large. Compared to total clicks, average clicks has a starker
representation of popularity: many clicks via few postings suggest highly popular.
Clicking Days. Next, we measure the number of clicking days in which a link received
clicks. This feature captures the consistency of attention on a link.
Max Clicks. Max clicks is the maximum daily clicks. Unlike total clicks, this statistic can
distinguish links that receive a burst of attention.
Effective Average Clicks. For those links with great total clicks, we observe some have
a large number of clicking days while some have only one clicking day but thousands
of clicks. Since average clicks considers only the relationship between total clicks and
posting count, here we introduce effective average clicks defined as total clicksclicking days
Click Standard Deviation. We already have features representing the fluctuation of time-
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lines, now we consider a feature for the fluctuation of daily clicks given that we have
specific sequence of daily clicks. We can calculate the standard deviation of daily clicks,
defined as click standard deviation. Note that we fix a month as our time window of study.
So, for each short link we have a sequence of daily clicks and we can compute the standard
deviation.
Mean Median Ratio. Finally, given 31 daily clicks of a link u, we can calculate its mean
and median daily clicks, denoted as mean(u) and median(u) respectively. Now suppose
we have a link obtaining thousands of clicks on a day but very few on other days. It may
have a considerable mean value but a low median. To build a connection between mean
and median, we define mean median ratio of u as the following: mean median ratio (u) =
mean(u)
median(u)+1
2.4 Experiments
In this section, we report a series of experiments designed to investigate the capacity of
these two behavioral perspectives – posting-based and click-based – on the effectiveness of
spam link detection. Recall that our goal here is to examine the effectiveness of behavioral
signals alone on spam detection. The core intuition is that these signals are more difficult
to manipulate than signals such as the content of a social media post or the content of
the underlying destination page. Of course, by integrating additional features such as
those studied in previous works – e.g., lexical features of tweet texts, features of user
profiles, and so forth – we could enhance the classification performance. Since these
traditional features may be more easily degraded by spammers, it is important to examine
the capability of a behavioral detector alone.
2.4.1 Experimental Setup
We consider two different sources of spam labels:
Spam Set 1: List Labeled. For the first set of spam labels, we use a community-
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maintained link-category website URLBlacklist (http://urlblacklist.com) that
provides a list of millions of domains and their corresponding high-level category (e.g.,
“News”, “Sports”). Among these high-level categories are two that are clearly malicious:
“Malware” and “Phishing”, and so we assign all links in our dataset that belong to one of
these two categories as spam. We assign all links that belong to the category “Whitelist” as
benign. It is important to note that many links belong to potentially dangerous categories
like “Adult”, “Ads”, “Porn”, and “Hacking”; for this list-based method we make the con-
servative assumption that all of these links belong to the unknown class. For all remaining
links, we assume they are unknown. This labeling approach results in 8,851 spam links,
223 benign, and 1,009,238 unknown. Of these links, we identify all with at least 100 total
clicks, resulting in 1,049 spam, 21 benign, and 60,012 unknown. To balance the datasets,
we randomly select 1,028 links from the unknowns (but avoid those above-mentioned dan-
gerous categories), and consider them as benign, leaving us with 1,049 spam and 1,049
benign links.
Spam Set 2: Manually Labeled. We augment the first spam set with this second collec-
tion. We randomly pick and manually label 500 short links, each of which has been posted
at least 30 times along with at least 5 original tweets (i.e., not a retweet, nor a reply tweet).
We label a link as “spam” if its landing page satisfies one of the following conditions: (1)
The browser client (Google Chrome in our work) or Bitly warns visitors that the final page
is potentially dangerous before redirecting; (2) The page is judged as a typical phishing
site; (3) After several redirectings, the final page is judged to be a typical “spam page”;
(4) Apparent crowdturfing websites such as what were introduced in [67]. Finally, we end
up with 124 manually-labeled malicious links: 79 spam ones, 30 irrelevant ads ones, and
15 pornographic ones. We also collect 214 benign links: 85 news ones, 70 blog ones, 49
video-audio ones, and 10 celebrity-related ones.
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Table 2.1: Evaluation results for the list-based dataset
Set of features Precision Recall F-Measure ROC area
All 15 features 0.742 0.737 0.736 0.802
Click-based only 0.647 0.647 0.647 0.705
Posting-based only 0.648 0.695 0.694 0.756
Clicking statistics only 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.679
For each dataset, we construct the five posting-based features and the ten click-based
features for all of the links. Then, we adopt the Random Forest classification algorithm
(which has shown strong results in a number of spam detection tasks, e.g., [68, 53, 51]),
using 10-fold cross-validation. The output of the classifier is a label for each link, either
spam or benign. We evaluate the quality of the classifier using several standard metrics:
average precision, recall, F-Measure and area under the ROC curve, equally-weighted for
both classes.
2.4.2 Experimental Results
Classification on the List-labeled Dataset. For the first dataset, we report the evaluation
results in Table 2.1. We find that using all features – both posting-based and click-based –
leads to a 0.74 precision, recall, and F-Measure, and a ROC area of 0.802. These results
are quite compelling, in that with no access to the content of the tweet nor the underlying
web destination, spam links may be identified with good success using only behavioral
patterns.
Next, we ask whether posting-based features or click-based features provide more
power in detecting spam links. We first exclude the five posting-based features and re-
port the Click-based only result in the table. We see even in this case we find a nearly
0.65 precision, recall, and F-Measure. When we drop click-based features in favor of a
Posting-based only, we see a similar result. These results show that individually the two
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Table 2.2: Top-10 features for list-labeled dataset (Chi-square)
Rank Features Score Category
1 Median friends 277.43 Posting
2 Average clicks 199.11 Clicking
3 Median followers 159.53 Posting
4 Effective average clicks 150.72 Clicking
5 Click standard deviation 141.62 Clicking
6 Mean median ratio 141.49 Clicking
7 Max clicks 137.38 Clicking
8 Total clicks 120.67 Clicking
9 Rise & Fall 78.18 Clicking
10 Score function 66.50 Posting
feature sets have reasonable distinguishing power, but that in combination the two reveal
complementary views of links leading to even better classification success.
We additionally consider the very restricted case of clicking statistics only (recall that
our click-based features include both clicking statistics and clicking timeline features). Us-
ing only the seven click statistics, we observe only a slight degradation in quality relative
to all click-based features.
To provide more insights into the impact of each feature, we use the Chi-square filter
to evaluate the importance of features to the classification result. The top 10 features
are shown in Table 2.2. Median friends and average clicks are the most two important
features. Generally speaking, click-based features tend to play more important roles than
posting-based features. Recall that our list-labeled dataset are those links with abundant
clicks received, but it is not guaranteed that they have adequate posting counts, which may
explain the ranking. For instance, if most links, either malicious or benign, have only one
or two posting days and posting counts is less than 5, their posting counts and posting
standard deviations will tend to be similar.
25
Table 2.3: Evaluation results for the manually-labeled dataset
Set of features Precision Recall F-Measure ROC area
All 15 features 0.860 0.861 0.859 0.921
Click-based only 0.828 0.828 0.828 0.888
Posting-based only 0.839 0.84 0.837 0.904
Clicking statistics only 0.842 0.843 0.841 0.875
Classification on the Manually-labeled Dataset. We repeat our experimental setup over
the second dataset and report the results here in Table 2.3. When we use the complete 15
features, the precision, recall, and F-Measure are all even higher than in the list-labeled
dataset case, around 0.86, with a ROC area of around 0.92. These results are encouraging.
We attribute the increase in performance relative to the first dataset to the more expansive
labeling procedure for the second dataset. In the list-labeled dataset, we only considered
extremely “bad” links since we considered only the “Malware” and “Phishing” categories.
This conservative assumption may lead to many spam-like links lurking in the set of benign
links. In contrast, the manually-labeled dataset considers more broadly the context of what
makes a spam link.
Continuing our experiments, we again consider subsets of features in the classification
experiment. Again, we find that using only a single feature type – either Click patterns
only or Posting patterns only – leads to fairly strong classification performance. But in
combination, the two provide complementary views on links that can be used for more
successful spam link detection.
Again, we use Chi-square filter to rank features, as shown in Table 2.4. Interestingly,
the ranking is quite different from what we found in Table 2.2, though again we observe
a mix of both posting and click-based features. We attribute some of this difference to
the click data’s availableness in the manually-labeled dataset; most of the links in the
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Table 2.4: Top-10 features for manually-labeled dataset (Chi-square)
Rank Features Score Category
1 Average clicks 149.41 Clicking
2 Posting count 144.23 Posting
3 Median followers 123.24 Posting
4 Median friends 118.19 Posting
5 Score function 87.00 Posting
6 Posting standard deviation 63.66 Posting
7 Click standard deviation 59.27 Clicking
8 Max clicks 58.56 Clicking
9 Mean median ratio 54.17 Clicking
10 Clicking days 45.93 Clicking
manually-labeled dataset have abundant posting information and we can see that the post-
ing behavior features play important roles in classification. On the contrary, most of the
links in the manually-labeled dataset do not have very large clicking traffic to support
clicking-based features. However, these two results – on the two disparate ground truth
datasets – demonstrate the viability of integrating click-based features into spam link de-
tection in social media, and the importance of integrating complementary perspectives
(both posting-based and click-based) into such tasks.
To further illustrate the significance of click and posting-based features, we consider
two of the top-ranked features in both datasets (recall Table 2.2 and Table 2.4): median
friends and average clicks. We compare the distributions of these two strongly correlated
features for all spam links and benign links, in Figure 2.4. For links in the list-based
dataset, as in Figure 2.4a, around 20% spam links are posted by users with a median
friends count of 0, and yet around 20% have a median friends count that exceeds 1,000.
These two types of posters could correspond to newly-registered accounts (0 friend) and
“high-quality” accounts like those in a for-pay campaign. In contrast, legitimate accounts
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(a) Median Friends
(b) Average clicks
Figure 2.4: Example feature comparison for spam and benign links
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who posted benign links have relatively “normal” distribution of median friends, that is,
most have median friends less than 300 and almost none has a zero median. For links
in manually-labeled dataset, as in Figure 2.4b, we see that spam links tend to have a
lower average clicks. A potential reason is that malicious links require more exposure or
other “abnormal means” to support consistent clicks, while legitimate links can survive
longer due to their appealing contents. We find similar distributions for other click-based
statistics, including the click standard deviation and the effective average clicks.
2.5 Summary
In summary, we investigate the potential of behavioral analysis aiding in uncovering
spam links in social media. Purely by behavioral signals, we have considered two perspec-
tives – (i) how links are posted through publicly-accessible Twitter data; and (ii) how links
are received by measuring their click patterns through the publicly-accessible Bitly click
API. The core intuition is that these signals are more difficult to manipulate than signals
such as the content of a social media post or the content of the underlying destination page.
Through an extensive experimental study over a dataset of 7 million Bitly-shortened links
posted to Twitter, we find accuracy of up to 86% purely based on these behavioral signals.
These results demonstrate the viability of integrating these publicly-available behavioral
cues into spam link detection in social media.
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3. COMBATING MANIPULATION: REVEALING ORGANIZED LINK SHARING
BEHAVIOR∗
In the previous section we explored the problem of detecting spam links via behavioral
analysis, as a concrete application toward combating the misbehavior of spamming on
social media. In this section, we turn to our second user misbehavior — manipulation
on social media. In particular, we investigate the task of revealing organized link sharing
behavior on social media and present a four-step approach, as follows.
3.1 Introduction
Link sharing is one of the most popular avenues to share information on Twitter. Users
can enrich their inherently limited length postings by inserting a link pointing to an exter-
nal resource such as a blog, video, or image. By doing so, many different viewpoints and
additional context can be expressed through link sharing.
While some link sharing is legitimate (i.e., “organic”), other sharing behaviors are
strategically manipulated (i.e., “organized”) with a common purpose. And the boundary
between these two extremes – organic and organized – is often not clear. Consider the
following examples:
• Figure 3.1 shows three users who tweeted the same link bit.ly/1dtous, linking
to a YouTube webpage related to the boy band One Direction. They all express
their affections for the band in their tweets. It seems very likely they are fans of
One Direction, which explains that they spontaneously posted the same link. This
common interest in a subject related to a link leads to the coincidence of multiple
∗Part of this section is reprinted with permission from "Organic or Organized?: Exploring URL Sharing
Behavior" by Cao C., Caverlee J., Lee K., Ge H., and Chuang J. In: Proceedings of the 24th ACM Inter-
national on Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM ’15). ACM, New York, NY,
USA, 513-522. Copyright 2015 by ACM.
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organically posted links.
• Figure 3.2 shows four more users who posted the same One Direction YouTube
link – bit.ly/1dtous. In this case, however, we can deduce that the users are
participating in a voting campaign to attract the band to their hometown. The users
are somewhat linked in this common desire.
• Continuing this theme, Figure 3.3 shows four additional users who have all tweeted
a “vote” for Boston to attract One Direction. In this case, the voting behavior is sus-
picious: the tweets have highly similar text, and the latter three tweets were posted
on the same day and the accounts names are quite similar. Were they organized to
post the same link? Are these accounts controlled by the same person? Is the first
account “innocent”?
• Finally, Figure 3.4 highlights three users who engage in a clear example of a some-
what sophisticated organized link spamming. Each user posts slightly different text
and different appearing links, though ultimately all of the links redirect to the same
destination link – an advertising webpage. This coordinated behavior of link sharing
is fundamentally different from the first case of organic link sharing.†
These observations motivate us to investigate link sharing in social media. Our goal, in
the context of link sharing, is to automatically (i) identify user groups in terms of similar
link sharing behaviors; and (ii) differentiate strategically organized and genuinely organic
user groups, through the development of a link-posting behavior based model. The key
insight motivating our work is that the publicly available link-posting information can
help model users with similar behaviors of link sharing, and that group-level behavioral
signals can characterize a group of users as organic or organized. To purify and improve
†These accounts have been alive for more than two years, which suggests the official Twitter spam policy
has limited impact on this type of manipulated link sharing behavior.
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Figure 3.1: One example of three users who have organically posted the same link:
bit.ly/1dtous
Figure 3.2: Four users seemingly post link for a voting campaign
Figure 3.3: Four users suspiciously cooperate to post the same link
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Figure 3.4: Three users coordinate to post the same advertising link
the information quality on their platform, it becomes imperative that the service provider
can detect those organized behaviors of link sharing, such as campaign-like advertising,
spamming, and other adversarial propagandas.
Given a group of organized users, on the one hand, we expect those users – no matter
whether managed by a command-and-control structure or not – post links toward a com-
mon goal. We do not argue the goal has to be malicious, like the example in Figure 3.3.
On the other hand, we focus on group-level behavioral evidence that can reflect their co-
ordination. For instance, the users in Figure 3.2 were seemingly participating in the same
“voting campaign”, but they actually have different goals (the targeting cities) and their
tweet content are quite distant. Even the users in Figure 3.3 seem suspicious, we need
more evidence and should design a systematic framework for detection.
Concretely, we propose a four-step approach. We first formulate link sharing based
on its three key factors: user, link, and the posting activity. Based upon such a model, we
design a similarity measurement of user behaviors in link sharing. Then, given the pairwise
similarity function, we build a user graph model from which we identify user groups each
of which contains users with similar link sharing behaviors. Next, on the group level, we
characterize the organic and organized user groups based on the link sharing behaviors of
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their members. Finally, we embed those characteristics into a classification framework to
systematically distinguish organic and organized groups of users.
3.2 Related Work
Recent studies have started to investigate link sharing in social media, with different
goals. One thread is about sharing intention, i.e., why people share links in social media.
Suh et al. found that embedding links is one of the most important factors for increasing the
retweetability of a tweet [69]. Smith et al. found that Twitter users add links to their tweets
when discussing controversial topics, toward spreading information instead of conversing
[70].
Another thread focuses on what people spread through links in social media, e.g.,
[15, 71, 72, 73]. These efforts have mainly focused on grouping similar messages or
grouping users, such that the links provide additional context that may reflect the interests
of the people posting these links.
Recently, several efforts have mentioned the dark side of link sharing in social media.
Stringhini et al. examined spam campaigns on Twitter that posted messages with links
pointing to the same site [74]. Grier et al. defined a spam campaign as the set of Twitter
accounts that spammed at least one blacklisted link in common [75], and Gao et al. did
similar things on Facebook [76]. Ghosh et al. studied the link farming on Twitter and
found many participants are sybil accounts. Among those top link farmers, 79% have
links pointing to their external webpages [7]. More recently, Nikiforakis et al. explored
the ecosystem of ad-based URL shortening services, and the vulnerabilities made possible
by these services [77].
Since 2006, there have been many social network-based sybil defense methods pro-
posed such as SybilGuard [78], SybilLimit [79], and SybilInfer [80]. Viswanath et al.
pointed out most of those approaches are essentially graph partitioning algorithms [81].
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They all made certain assumptions of the social network topology, used ground-truth in-
formation of trusted users, ranked all users, and determined who are sybils based on some
cutoff. Rather than exclusively focus on spammers or sybils, our interest is to reveal groups
of strategically organized users who engage in link sharing with a purpose: some of the
groups will post spam, but many others spread propaganda, aggressively promote products
or services, and generally engage in coordinated manipulation. Unlike spamming or sub-
verting reputation, the users we consider can be genuine and legitimate, as in Figure 3.3.
Additionally, our problem is more general in the sense that our approach can detect those
“link-posting based” sybils attacks or spam campaigns. We explicitly model and identify
groups of users who have similar behaviors of link sharing, and differentiate the organized
and organic groups via a group-level classification framework.
3.3 Methodology
In this section, we propose our approach to explore similar user behaviors in link shar-
ing. In this context, our objective is to (i) formulate and collect user groups; and (ii)
differentiate the organic and organized user groups. To tackle this problem, we formulate
the concept of user group in the context of link sharing, and focus exclusively on behav-
ioral signals. We are interested in answering the following questions: How do we model
user in link sharing? How do we define and find user group? And how can we distinguish
between organic and organized user group?
Toward answering these questions, our approach is structured in four steps. The main
intuition is that the users from an organic group coincidently share similar interests on cer-
tain subjects so that they have similar behaviors of link sharing. On the contrary, organized
groups consist of users who plot to post links with a certain goal in common so that their
behaviors conform to a notion of cooperation or coordination.
• First, we model the user in link sharing, and design a similarity measurement to
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quantify similar behaviors between users.
• Second, we construct a user graph where nodes are users who have posted links and
then identify user groups from the graph.
• Then, we extract group-level features to characterize organized user groups and or-
ganic user groups.
• Finally, we build a classifier for distinguishing organized and organic user groups.
We tackle each of these steps in turn, as follows.
3.3.1 Modeling the Behavior of Link Sharing
Link sharing on Twitter is fundamentally different from other popular activities such
as tweeting, re-tweeting, and following. To systematically investigate users with similar
behaviors of link sharing, we model the three factors in link sharing: the user, the link,
and the action of sharing (posting). In the meanwhile, we need to pay attention on the
following three issues. First, we should consider all links every user has ever posted on
Twitter so that our model is general. Second, we should design a measurement that can
quantify user similarity in link sharing. Third, it should take the link posting behavior
into account. Such a measurement should be more specific towards link sharing than other
traditional user similarity based on profiles, social neighborhood, tweet content, and so
forth. Therefore, we aim to model users engaged in link sharing with two facets in mind:
(i) which links a user has ever posted; and (ii) how (s)he posted them.
3.3.1.1 User, link, and posting
Our key idea is that, in terms of the posting behaviors, a user can be characterized by
all the links he has posted and how often he has posted them. For instance, a user who likes
sports tends to share more links linking to sports websites than links of politics websites. A
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Japanese user is prone to post more links of Japanese websites than English websites. Two
users who may have a realistic social relationship can have distinct tastes and preferences
in link sharing, but their posting behaviors (especially the posting frequency of different
links) may reflect such a scenario. It is even more prominent for strategically organized
users. Those who have the same intention of link sharing can have quite similar posting
behaviors, e.g., intensively posting certain link but barely mention others.
Formally, suppose we have a set of m users U = {u1, u2, ..., um}. If ui, in to-
tal, posted k different links v1, v2, . . . , vk, we define such an associated link set of ui as
pui = {v1, v2, . . . , vk}. By aggregating all users, we get a link set V = {v1, v2, ..., vn} =⋃
ui∈U pui . Therefore, each pair (ui, vj) can be seen as an action of posting a link.
We introduce the function f(ui, vj) that quantifies such a posting of vj by ui. Here, we
give a straightforward definition f(ui, vj) = PostingCount(ui, vj) which represents the
concrete posting count of every pair (ui, vj). Given a user ui ∈ U , we can represent ui by
an n-dimension vector ui = (f(ui, v1), f(ui, v2), . . . , f(ui, vn)).
3.3.1.2 User similarity in link sharing
We have two considerations to design a user similarity measure in link sharing. On the
one hand, if both users have posted overlapping links, the more intersections they have,
the closer they are. On the other hand, we want to take the posting count into account.
If two users posted the same link many times, we reward the similarity between them. If
not, we penalize them if they have quite distant posting counts for the same link they have
posted. Thus, we propose a measurement of user similarity defined as:
sim(ui, uj) =
n∑
k=1
ln(min(f(ui, vk), f(uj, vk)) + 1)
|f(ui, vk)− f(uj, vk)|+ 1 (3.1)
We sum over all links to favor those pairs having posted many links in common. We
pick the smaller posting count among two users (min(f(ui, vk), f(uj, vk))) as the pair-
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level scale of the posting count, and take the logarithm considering it can be quite large.
We put the difference of posting counts as the denominator. We ensure a link can contribute
towards the similarity only if it was posted at least once by both users, yet it’s different
from traditional “cosine-like” measures as we explicitly emphasize the penalization.
3.3.2 Identifying User Groups
Given the definition of user similarity, the next question is how to find those users
having similar behaviors of link sharing. Given a set of users U = {u1, u2, ..., um}, the
task of user group identification is to find a collection of user groups C = {c0, c1, . . . , ck}
where ∀ci, cj ∈ C, ci, cj ⊂ U and ci ∩ cj = ∅.
The user similarity function can only locally measure the pairwise connection. There-
fore, if we want to globally consider all possible users, adopting a graph structure is a
natural choice. Extensive existing algorithms can partition a graph into connected compo-
nents, which can fit our concept of user group here. In general, a user graph G = (V,E)
can be defined by V = U and E = {(ui, uj)|∀ui, uj ∈ U , weight(ui, uj) = sim(ui, uj)}.
However, if we consider all possible user pairs, the resulting graph can be huge: it will
have only one connected component where most connections are weak. Hence, we need a
specific version of a user graph upon which we can extract our interested user groups.
3.3.2.1 The kNN user graph
If we simply set a global threshold to filter out low-weight edges, we may lose im-
portant information. For example, the users from an organized group unnecessarily (and
usually do not) post many links of popular websites — they have their own targets to
spread. As a result, those users may be excluded from the graph due to the lack of over-
lapping links with others, and finally we may obtain only a few big components in which
people share popular websites.
Since we are interested in those organized users, our graph model should be able to
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grasp those “abnormal connections”. Organized users do not often share various links,
whereas the nature of coordination leads to their locally firm neighborhoods within the
group. To retain such “conspiracies” as much as possible, we require a model that empha-
sizes the mutually steady neighborhood. Thus, we adapt the model of k nearest neighbor
(kNN) graph.
The kNN user graph connects ui and uj only if ui is among the k-nearest neighbors
of uj . Such a restriction retains only those k strongest neighborhoods, with less emphasis
on the edge weight. A formal definition of the kNN user graph G = (V,E) is V =
U and E = {(ui, uj) | ∀ui ∈ knn(uj),∀uj ∈ knn(ui)}. Here, knn(ui) is a function
defined as {uj|∀uj ∈ neib(ui), sim(ui, uj) ∈ maxk({sim(ui, uj)|∀uj ∈ neib(ui)})},
where neib(ui) is the set of ui’s neighbors and maxk(S) returns the k largest elements
given S. Now, since any node can have k neighbors, a group of users who post unusual
links can still form a big component.
3.3.2.2 Extracting user groups
It is a non-trivial task to extract a collection of user groups from the user graph. The
concept of connected component in graph theory naturally matches our concept of user
group, but we need two more considerations. First, we require that every group should
have a compact size. Hence, we discard those small connected components (e.g., fewer
than five members), and decompose those large components into smaller ones. Second, we
hope the partition algorithm to be general, i.e., having been proved effective and efficient
on many different types of graphs. Thus, we choose the well-known Louvain method [82],
which is one of the most widely-used algorithms in community detection [83].
The Louvain method is a greedy algorithm to maximize the modularity of a graph
structure. It starts by locally optimizing modularity for small communities, and then
iteratively repeats to aggregate until reaching a maximum of modularity. Though the
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modularity optimization problem is known as NP-hard, the Louvain algorithm can run
in O(n log n) in most practical cases so that it already has many mature implementations.
Its maximum modularity ensures it conservatively segments big components only when it
does contain multiple modularities.
3.3.3 Characterization: Organized vs. Organic
Given a collection of user components (groups) that we have extracted, our ultimate
goal is to systematically distinguish organized and organic user groups. But before that,
we need to characterize these two types of groups. Suppose we have a group of users
who have similar behaviors of link sharing, we want to feature to what degree they have
organized behaviors when posting links.
First, we should ensure our features build upon the group level. Our biggest interest is
the collective user behavior, which is fundamentally different from individual spamming
or sybil behavior. Second, our features should target the behavioral signals of posting. We
have seen in Figure 3.4 how easily the posters manipulated their tweet content to disguise
themselves. Moreover, they unnecessarily follow each other as long as they post the same
links. So, our insight here is those traditional features based on either text content or
network structure become vulnerable for the organized user group in our context. On the
contrary, what they cannot cover are the links they posted (they hope more exposures after
all), the time-stamps they posted (they have to leave the records anyway), and their own
profiles (they use public profiles so that others can see their postings). Therefore, in this
section, we introduce nine group-level features that cover three posting-related aspects:
posted links, posting time, and poster profile.
3.3.3.1 Posted link based features
Our motivation is that, intuitively, the users in an organized group usually have a clear
goal of promoting certain links. Thus, they have a relatively narrow selection of links they
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post, and each link gets high-volume postings. Instead, an organic group usually posts a
variety of links each of which has reasonable amounts of exposure. Therefore, we come
up with two group-level features that capture the diversity of the posted links.
Suppose we have a user group c = {u1, u2, . . . , uk}, and we know the set of links
posted by every member, i.e., pui . Thus, we can extend it to the group level, as well as the
posting count f(ui, vj). Both can be formulated as the following:
pci = ∪uj∈cipuj (3.2)
f(ci, vj) =
∑
ui∈ci
f(ui, vj) (3.3)
Based upon these definitions, we provide the following two posted link based features:
• Average Posting Count. We can calculate the average posting count per link by the
ratio of |pc| and
∑
vj∈pc f(c, vj). By our motivation explained above, we expect
organized groups have higher values of such feature than organic ones.
• Link Posting Entropy. Entropy is an important measure of uncertainty in informa-
tion theory. Here, in our case, to describe the diversity of posted links in a group,
we extend it to link posting entropy, computed as:
H(c) = −
∑
vj∈pc
f(c, vj)∑
vj∈pc f(c, vj)
log
f(c, vj)∑
vj∈pc f(c, vj)
(3.4)
And based on the same idea, we suppose that organic groups have larger link posting
entropy than organized ones.
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3.3.3.2 Posting time based features
One of the most important posting behavioral signals is the posting timestamp of every
tweet. The poster has no access to tamper with such information, making it a potentially
robust feature. For each poster, we can collect a posting time series so we can compute
all the posting intervals, defined as the temporal differences between consecutive posting
timestamps. Our motivation here is: with the goal of promoting or advocating, the users
from an organized group usually post tweets in a similar frequency, and the intervals tend
to be short as they are eager to rapidly increase the exposures of their links. Therefore, we
propose two group-level posting interval related features, measuring both the quantity and
the deviation.
• Posting Interval Median. For every user, we can always quantify the posting interval
by some temporal unit. Then we get the individual posting interval median by taking
the median among all intervals. We use median rather than mean mainly because
it is more robust to outliers. Moreover, since we care more about the group level,
we take a further median over all members in a group. As mentioned, we expect
organized groups have shorter interval medians than organic ones.
• Posting Interval Deviation. As said, our inference is that the organized accounts have
similar posting manners, or even are bots manipulated by the same person. Thus, we
can compute the group-level posting interval deviation given the individual interval
median. Since an organic group is likely to post more randomly, we expect organic
groups have larger deviations.
3.3.3.3 Poster profile based features
Compared to an organized group, our main motivation here is that the users in an
organic group have more various demographics. Given a group of organized accounts, if
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their goal is improper (e.g., advertising, spamming), they are mostly managed (like sybils)
or hired (like for-pay turkers) by the same agent so they have close demographics. Even if
their goal is relatively legitimate (e.g., propaganda, voting), their conspiracy attributes their
enthusiastic interests on some common subjects, which can be reflected on their profiles
to certain degree, too.
The profile information is one of the best publicly-available resources we can utilize
to infer the diversity of demographics. We reify it into three aspects: total number of
posted tweets, account registration date, and followers (friends) count. We calculate the
group-level deviation of the total number of tweets, of the followers counts, and measure
the average interval of the registration time.
• Tweets Counts Deviation. We count the total number of tweets an account has posted
ever since the beginning, and take the deviation among all accounts in a group. The
larger deviation means the more variety, so we expect an organic group has a larger
tweets counts deviation than an organized one.
• Followers Counts Deviation. We record the count of followers for every user in
a group. The count can be dynamic over time so we take the median. Then we
take the deviation among all members. We believe the count of followers is more
reliable than of friends simply because it is more difficult to fabricate. Again, we
expect organized groups have lower deviations.
• Registration Interval Median. It is similar to how we computed the posting interval
median. We look into the registration date of each user so that we have a registra-
tion time series for every group, and then we take the median. Our idea is that the
registration interval is one of the most direct evidences for those fabricated or hired
accounts. We prefer median to mean because the latter one is too sensitive to out-
liers. We expect organized groups have smaller registration interval medians than
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organic groups, similar to the reason for the posting interval median.
Then, we come up with two more features related to the registration date. We define
the user lifespan by counting the temporal span, in terms of days, from the day an account
registered to his latest posting date in our dataset. The motivation here is that the user
lifespan is one of the most important user profile information and it should be quite random
for users from an organic group. Instead, the organized users are created for a certain link-
promotion mission, so they all tend to have short lifespans. Another idea is that Twitter
may already have detected the suspicious behaviors from organized users and suspended
them, leading to short lifespans too. Hence, we provide two features to characterize the
group-level user lifespan via the quantity and the deviation.
• Poster Lifespan Median. We take the median of all accounts’ lifespans in a group.
As said, we suppose an organized group generally has a shorter poster lifespan me-
dian.
• Poster Lifespan Deviation. Every member from a group has a lifespan so we can
calculate the group-level deviation. We expect organic ones have larger lifespan
deviations.
3.3.4 Classification: Organized vs. Organic
Recall that our ultimate goal is to automatically discern organized and organic user
groups, in the context of link sharing. Given the features in the previous section, it becomes
quite natural that we embed them into a classification framework. To choose appropriate
classification algorithms, we should guarantee: (i) the algorithm has been widely used and
maturely implemented; and (ii) we need to test on multiple algorithms.
We choose 4 well-known classification algorithms in our framework: Random Forest
[84], Naive-Bayes Decision Tree [85], Sequential Minimal Optimization [86], and Additive
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Logistic Regression [87]. We notate them RandomForest, NBTree, SMO, and LogitBoost,
respectively. NBTree is a decision tree learning algorithm in which the tree leaves are
naive Bayes classifiers. SMO algorithm is used for training the support vector classifier
and has been implemented in many existing SVM libraries like LIBSVM [88]. LogitBoost
can be seen as a variant of AdaBoost [89] that adapts logistic regression techniques. All
of them have mature implemented packages. With different theoretical foundations, these
four candidates can well-serve the testing algorithms in our experiment.
3.4 Experiments
We present our experimental studies in this section. We first introduce our data. Then,
we describe how we identified all the user groups we formulated. Third, we provide
details how we collected the ground truth. Finally, we show our analysis results towards
distinguishing organized versus organic user groups.
3.4.1 Data
We deployed a tweet crawler via the official Twitter Streaming API from October
2011 to October 2013. Since our main interest is link sharing, we only collect tweets
that contain links. The API provides a 1% sample of all published tweets, but our 24-
month uninterrupted crawling gives us 1.6 billion “raw URLs” posted by 136 million
accounts. Raw URLs are those URLs in their original format when posted, without any
further processing (e.g., resolution) after being crawled. Due to either irregular typing or
the URL shortening service, many raw URLs become inaccessible or actually link to the
same webpage. For instance, we have both WWw.TwiTtEr.com and tWITTER.com/
in our dataset, as well as bit.ly/1a8jUOr and bitly.com both of which direct to
the same destination.
To address such an issue of URL variants, we need to resolve for all URLs. Since
resolving billions of URLs can be expensive, we focus on URLs that appeared at least 50
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times. We resolve through standard HTTP requests and record the landing long links. The
summary of our dataset is shown in Table 3.1: 47 million accounts have shared 1.6 million
raw URLs within 445 million tweets. 82% raw URLs get resolved to nearly 1.2 million
distinct long links. 869 thousand accounts have generated at least 50 postings.
Table 3.1: Dataset Summary
# Raw URLs (resolved) # tweets # long links # domain names # Posters (with ≥ 50 postings)
1,617,234 (1,327,729) 445 million 1,199,930 166,107 47,658,839 (869,571)
Given a resolved long link, we ignore all its post-parameters as a reasonable approxi-
mation to the link. We call the remaining part domain name and we obtain 166,000 unique
ones. Compared to a complete link, we believe the domain name has better interpretabil-
ity because it can conceptually represent a “website”. For users, we exclude those who
just occasionally share links, i.e., less than 50 postings. To model the user, we decide to
also use link’s domain name as the dimension. One reason is that using original long link
may result in extremely sparse user vector given enormous dimensions. Another reason
is a user group can be better interpreted if each member corresponds to some “website”
instead of a long HTML page link.
3.4.2 Collecting User Groups
To construct the kNN user graph, a non-trivial issue is how to choose an appropriate k.
We adopt the idea in [90] to pick k roughly equal to ln(|U|). Thus, 869,571 users give us
k of 14. In the end, we obtain a user graph containing 216,523 nodes and 3,862,116 edges.
This graph contains 12,251 connected components most of which are small: only 2,150
components have no less than 5 nodes and just 36 components are bigger than 100. We
filter out those tiny components smaller than 5, and exhaustively decompose (if possible)
46
large ones bigger than 100 to ensure maximal modularity. Eventually, we identify 2,775
groups, together including 192,719 users. Among those 2,775 groups, we find around 40%
groups are smaller than 10, and nearly 90% groups are bounded by 100 users. The largest
one has 14,080 users.
How can we find a way to see whether our identified user groups are “meaningful”?
And how to interpret and measure it here? Naturally, the most direct evidence is our groups
maintain closer manners of link sharing behaviors than “a random user group”, yet we
need a way to measure it. The entropy of posted links in a group is one of the most typical
properties that capture the similar link sharing behavior, as explained in Section 3.3.3.
Thus, first, we simulate a collection of user groups with the exact same sizes via randomly
picking users from our dataset. Then, we compare the distributions of the link posting
entropy for our collected groups and the simulated ones. The result is in Figure 3.5, and
we clearly see the difference. Around 20% of our groups have a zero entropy, i.e., all the
members posted the same link all the time, and the median is about 1.5. On the contrary,
none of the simulated groups have a 0 entropy, and the median is around 4 while 80% of
our groups are below it.
Besides the natural evidence from those link-posting related features, we hope to see
more different evidence showing our collected groups are meaningful. Here, we adopt the
group-level language usage entropy to measure certain “homophily” among all members
in a group. The intuition is that if a set of users have similar selections of links (embed-
ded in their tweets), then their language choice in their tweets should be similar. Con-
versely, two users who have distinct language backgrounds would hardly overlap many
links. Therefore, for each group, we aggregate all the published tweets (with or without
links, having valid language usage information), count the usage frequency, and calculate
the entropy. To compare, again we simulate the user groups with the exactly same sizes.
We compare their distributions in Figure 3.6, and find the contrast is apparent.
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Figure 3.5: The link posting entropy CDF of our collected user groups, compared with a
collection of simulated random groups
About 30% groups in our collection whose language entropy is 0, i.e., all members
always use the same language writing tweets. 90% of our groups have entropies less than
2.0. In contrast, in the simulated collection, almost none have 0 entropy, and the median
is between 1.5 to 2.0 where 80% of our groups are below it. This comparison shows the
users in our identified groups have much similar language usages. Recall that our method
of computing user groups has not used any user information on language usage, which
demonstrates the potential of extending our approach into general problems related to user
similarity.
3.4.3 Ground Truth
To test our proposed features in Section 3.3.3 on characterizing organized and organic
groups, we need a set of groups with known labels of either organized or organic. Since
there is no such existing ground truth, we randomly pick 1,000 of our identified groups,
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Figure 3.6: The language usage entropy CDF of our collected user groups, compared with
a collection of simulated random groups
and manually check each of them as follows.
3.4.3.1 Manual labeling setup
Our labeling for each group is a two-tier task: (i) categorizing the content of the links
the members posted and inferring the purpose that they posted links; (2) and rating to what
degree we think their behaviors were organized or organic.
The rating task directly connects to our interest here, but the categorization task can
help us interpreting the similar user behaviors. Our focus is to collectively seek for group-
level evidence that reflects the coordinated behaviors of posting links, not just individually
inspecting each account. In particular, we examine the accounts in each group through
looking into their: (1) tweets (e.g., all the posted links, landing webpages, and tweets
that contain links); (2) account profile (e.g., self-introduction, name, avatar, language,
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geo location); and (3) posting pattern (e.g., the URL shortening pattern, textual pattern in
tweets, posting timeline pattern). If a group is too large, we randomly pick at least 5 users
with accessible information to judge. Judges make decisions without knowledge of the
proposed features in Section 3.3.3.
To measure to what extent a group is coordinating can be subtle. Our ratings will be the
scores between 1 to 5, the larger the more suspicious towards an organized group. Then,
we transform our scores to the label of either organized or organic. It is an organized group
if its score is above 3, and organic if below 3. If its score is 3, we inspect it again. By such
a 5-scale rating, we avoid curtly labeling a group is organized or organic.
We assign 3 annotators the exactly same set of 1,000 user groups, and separately ask
them to manually label each group as organized or organic. Since the number of our an-
notators is odd, if the individual decisions of our 3 annotators have a clear “major voting”,
we take it as the final result. The rating usually has an obvious favor (below or above 3),
and we accept a category if it has been mentioned by at least two annotators. Otherwise,
a fourth annotator adds a label and a rating. We finalize a category or rating only when
it has two or more endorsements, and count a user group has valid labels only if it finally
obtains at least one category or rating.
3.4.3.2 Categorizing a user group
As said, our categorization aims to infer the common intent of a group of users who
have similar link sharing behaviors. The idea is that organized groups have a much clearer
goal in common than organic groups, even though the purpose can be either improper
(e.g., advertising, spamming) or legitimate (e.g., self-promoting, preaching). In practice,
we do find sometimes speculating the intention is not obvious, so we change to summarize
the content of posted links and tweets in this case. In the meanwhile, we find usually
categorizing a group is more difficult than rating it, especially if the members post quite
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various subjects or many non-sense words. Finally, among all the 1,000 randomly picked
groups we have judged, 773 ones have been labeled by at least one of the 12 categories in
Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: The distribution (percentage) of twelve categories that we have labeled for our
user groups
advertising spamming app-auto-generated entertainment social-media adult
318 (41%) 195 (25%) 171 (22%) 66 (8%) 33 (4%) 22 (3%)
news blog follow-back public-information propaganda voting
20 (3%) 10 (1%) 8 (1%) 6 (0.8%) 6 (0.8%) 4 (0.5%)
The category of advertising emphasizes the intention of posting links. It includes ev-
erything about absorbing viewer’s attention on the link, such as marketing, funds-raising,
or even self-promotion of personal websites or uploads. We have seen instances that all
members in a group shared links connecting to the exactly same news articles or blogs.
We still think such a group is suspicious to advertising. Moreover, the irrelevance between
the content of tweets and the linked webpages can also indicate the poster is advertising,
and one example is shown in Figure 3.7.
We make the assumption that Twitter’s official suspension indicates spamming activ-
ities to some extent. In addition, if the browser or the shortening service warns when we
click into a link, we believe it is a spam link. Other than that, we label spamming if the
links reaching to some typical spam webpage of “phishing” or “malware”. For instance,
we categorize a group full of users like the left-hand two in Figure 3.8 into spamming,
because their posted links point to the phishing website shown in the rightmost subfigure.
App-auto-generated is a special category. All users in such a group posted tweets
(containing links) automatically generated by some external app or service. Usually it
happens when the poster is unconscious or at least not intentionally doing so, e.g., using
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Figure 3.7: Example users whose group is organized
Figure 3.8: Example users whose group we categorize into “spam” and think is organized
own Twitter account to log in some mobile game. For entertainment, we find groups of
fans who posted links about their supported artists like we have seen in Figure 3.1, 3.2, 3.3.
Sometimes they can be voting (like in Figure 3.2 and 3.3), but many are just bonded by
fan’s passion. Other entertainment groups often talked about music, video game or anime.
News are mostly about politics and technology. Propaganda usually relates to politics and
religion.
Social-media and blog stress the source website. These websites can host various web-
pages, and typical examples are youtube.com, instagram.com, and blogspot.
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com, etc. This also explained we found many such groups. The groups of public-information
posted links of public information like traffic or weather. The posters usually are accounts
managed by regional institutions.
Among all these 12 categories, some are capturing the purpose of posting (e.g., adver-
tising, spamming, propaganda), and some are summarizing the content of posting (e.g.,
entertainment, social-media, news). A user group can have more than one category, e.g.,
mixed with spam, adult, and advertising. In total, from Table 3.2 we can see advertising
and spamming together take up 66% appearances of all categories. This observation re-
flects our idea that the kNN graph model, emphasizing the locally pairwise connection,
can potentially retain many abnormal behaviors.
Another interesting finding is the category of app-auto-generated surprisingly occupied
22%. Its substantive existence leads to a new thread for future work: the user-unconscious
posting behavior in social media, caused by some external application. What security
issues could it raise? Do most posts contain links? If yes, can our study of link sharing be
an entry point?
3.4.3.3 Rating a user group
For rating, what has been posted matters less, and we care more on who have posted
and how. As mentioned, we look over the profiles of all accounts from the same group.
We seek for similar patterns between them in self-introduction, name, avatar picture, etc.
We rate above 3 if we see highly overlapped textual patterns in their tweets such as the
posting date, hashtag, language and URL shortening. Figure 3.7 includes two accounts
with identical posting timeline, tweets content, and similar names. Their group is the
instance that we rate 5. It becomes even more dubious when the members always retweet
each other’s tweets. A typical “rate-5” example is in Figure 3.8. The users, who have
extremely close posting timelines and names, always retweeted from the other account.
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Our rating focuses on the collective behavioral evidences of coordination, independent
with the posting purpose. For example, we find most groups of entertainment are users
spontaneously talk about the subjects they like, but it becomes suspicious when the URLs
link to the same music video page on Youtube. Most groups of public-information have
fairly legitimate goal of posting, but naturally many accounts are centrally managed so
they still have many common patterns.
If all members in a group have been suspended (and we label it as a spamming group),
we cannot access their accounts so we conservatively leave them unrated. For those
groups of app-auto-generated or social-media, we mainly judge their postings are whether
advertising-oriented or unconscious, and we usually find most of them fall into the latter
scenarios. The groups of news, social-media or blog often share popular news, blog arti-
cle, and online forum. We rate them low except we find they advertised their own-related
(person or institution) webpages.
3.4.4 Experiments: Organized vs. Organic
3.4.4.1 Analyzing our labeling
As introduced, we finalize the labeling result for each user group via adopting the major
vote over our 3 annotators. We find 986 groups that have been labeled at least one of the
categorization and rating results, and 602 ones that received both. The fourth annotator
agreed on 871 (88.3%) and 520 (86.4%) ones, respectively. Finally, we obtain 815 groups
with ratings where 325 (40%) are organized and 490 (60%) are organic.
Those 602 groups with both information of category and rating give us the opportunity
to understand the following questions: Which subjects our collected groups mostly talked
about? What kinds of content the organized groups and organic groups usually posted?
Are they different? Can we see a relation between the levels of organized behavior and the
types of link?
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We aggregate the average rating each group received by the group category, and plot
the CDFs of our ratings for all 12 categories in Figure 3.9. We can see the distributions
take on clear gradients. If we look at the median, 12 categories are evenly divided by the
rate of 3. The groups of spamming, adult, and follow-back are most likely as organized,
followed by advertising, public-information, and propaganda whose distributions are quite
close. Then, blog, voting, entertainment and news have similar distributions, most of
whose groups are organic. Social-media and app-auto-generated groups are the least likely
organized (recall how we rate them). These observations reveal the connection between the
level of organized behavior and the inherent content of different categories. For spamming,
adult, follow-back, advertising, they essentially include those improper ingredients that
motivate more organized behaviors. On the contrary, the category of app-auto-generated is
user-unconscious, and blog, news, entertainment and social-media naturally contain more
legitimate activities, so their groups tend to be more organic.
3.4.4.2 Classifying organized and organic groups
We are ready to build the classifier. In terms of posting behaviors in link sharing, can
our proposed group-level features distinguish the organized and organic groups? Which
features work best? Which classification algorithm performs best?
To address the issue of class imbalance, we give a hybrid solution that combines un-
dersampling of the majority class and oversampling the rare one. In the end, we have 406
organic and 406 organized groups, and we normalize the values of each feature to the in-
terval of 0 to 1. To evaluate, we do 10-fold cross validation and focus on precision, recall,
F-measure, and ROC area. We first consider the two classes are equally important and take
the average. The results are in Figure 3.10.
The performance achieves around 0.8 no matter which method or measure we choose.
RandomForest works best with high F-measure (0.836) and ROC area (0.921). All the
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Figure 3.9: The CDFs of our ratings for all 12 types of group categories
Figure 3.10: Evaluation results by four classification methods
results suggest the potential of our approach for distinguishing organized and organic user
groups, purely based on behavioral signals in link sharing.
In reality, detecting organized user groups becomes more important. We especially
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want to find out organized groups as many as possible, corresponding to the measure of
recall. Thus, we further show the recall result for the class of organized in Figure 3.11.
We see those two decision tree based algorithms outperform the other two, and even better
than their own averaged results in Figure 3.10. This observation hints us we can prioritize
decision tree based algorithms when we solve such a problem in practice.
Figure 3.11: The recall results for the class of organized group by four classification meth-
ods
Another investigation is the feature impact. We select two popular measures — Chi-
squared and Information gain — to evaluate each feature with respect to the class. The
full ranking is in Table 3.3. We see the rankings by chi-square and information gain are
almost identical. We have 3 interesting discoveries. First, the two link based features
always rank in the top 3. This suggests the link-related property is the most reliable aspect
when we study link sharing. Second, if we have two features from the same type (e.g.,
lifespan deviation and median), the deviation feature always has more influence than the
median one. One possible explanation is that the median value is too sensitive compared
to the dispersion value. This tells us those features derived from a relative measure can
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be more robust than those from an absolute measure. Third, the feature of poster lifespan
deviation performs the best. It favors our intuition in Section 3.3.3: User lifespan is one of
the strongest signals to capture the diversity of poster demographics.
Table 3.3: The rankings of the feature impact measured by Chi-Squared and Info Gain
Chi-Squared Info Gain
Poster Lifespan Deviation Poster Lifespan Deviation
Average Posting Count Average Posting Count
Link Posting Entropy Link Posting Entropy
Registration Interval Median Registration Interval Median
Poster Lifespan Median Tweets Counts Deviation
Tweets Counts Deviation Poster Lifespan Median
Posting Interval Deviation Posting Interval Deviation
Posting Interval Median Posting Interval Median
Followers Counts Deviation Followers Counts Deviation
We conduct two more informative comparisons of organic versus organized groups.
One is about the number of distinct link domains that a group has posted. Our idea is
that organized groups tend to have a much tighter selection of links to post than organic
groups, mainly due to their specific common goal of posting. In Figure 3.12, we find the
significant gap between two classes. More than 20% of organic groups have mentioned at
least 100 different link domains in their tweets, and yet the median for organized groups
is merely no more then 10. 20% of organized groups have posted only one kind of link
domain all along.
The final exploration comes back to Twitter itself. We would like to see how the
Twitter’s official monitoring reacts for the two types of similar user behaviors in link shar-
ing. So, we calculate the group-level suspension percentage in each of our groups, i.e.,
how many accounts in a group have been suspended. Recall that we have excluded those
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Figure 3.12: Organized vs. organic: number of link domain names
groups whose members were all suspended. We have two interesting observations from
Figure 3.13. On the one hand, the distributions of our two types of groups are quite dis-
cerning. We find 80% of organic groups have less than 10% suspension percentage, where
80% of organized groups are more than it in contrast. Twitter’s suspension is for indi-
viduals, yet it still reflects on our user groups formulated through link sharing. On the
other hand, we find the official suspension still has limited impact on the organized post-
ing behavior: the median is just around 30%. These findings suggest the complementary
potential of our investigations on organized user behavior in link sharing.
3.5 Summary
In summary, we are interested in exploring users with manipulated behaviors when
they share links on social media. While some users organically share common interests
on certain websites, some are organized to aggressively promote the same links towards
a common goal. This motivates us to tackle the problem of distinguishing organized and
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Figure 3.13: Organized vs. organic: group-level suspension ratio
organic users in the context of link sharing on social media. Focusing on the behavioral
signals of posting links, we propose a four-step approach to model, identify, character-
ize, and classify those two types of user groups. We test our approach on four different
classification algorithms and in most cases it performs good in terms of precision, recall,
F-measure, and ROC area. Random Forest algorithm works best with 0.921 ROC. Our
experimental analysis demonstrated the capability of our approach for (i) understanding
users with similar link sharing behaviors; and (ii) distinguishing the level of manipulated
user behaviors of link sharing.
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4. COMBATING DISTORTION: IDENTIFYING BS ON SOCIAL MEDIA
In the previous two sections we have studied two specific problems toward tackling
user misbehavior on social media — spamming and manipulation. In this section we
investigate a newly emerging misbehavior on social media — distortion. We choose a
unique perspective of user misbehavior that widely exists on social media: making bullshit
(BS) statements. We formulate the problem, build a classification model detecting social
media posts that are likely to be called BS, and present our experiment analysis, as follows.
4.1 Introduction
The use of the term “bullshit” (BS) has been on the rise since the mid 20th century.∗
But what, exactly, constitutes BS? Philosopher Harry Frankfurt addresses this question in
his two seminal books: On Bullshit and On Truth [28, 29]. Frankfurt describes BS as a
statement that does not address facts, but rather “misrepresents what the BS-er is up to.”
Frankfurt explains “one of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much
BS” [28].
For example, advertisers often rely on BS, as in one case study that shows that many
brands of coffee claim they are “99.9% caffeine free,” however — due to the serving-
size — these brands are as caffeinated as “strong coffee [which is] also 99.9% caffeine
free” [31]. This kind of advertising is not only misleading, but can actually cause severe
health problems for people who are caffeine intolerant [91]. In a similar vein, researchers
have found that political candidates that BS more were seen more favorably during the
recent 2016 US Presidential election [17].
Of course, BS reaches beyond politics and advertising. The development of online
social media has provided humanity with the ability to share information like never before.
∗https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=BS
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This has made it trivial to spread false information without accountability. While there are
undoubtedly benefits to increased social media options, the current ecosystem has grown to
facilitate the production of BS. This trend has not gone unnoticed by online communities
and researchers alike. For example, there is a Reddit board dedicated to calling BS.† There
is a BS-generator that produces BS based on user-submitted and crawled tweets.‡ There is
even a credit-bearing class taught at the University of Washington on “calling BS.” §
In this paper, we aim to extend Harry Frankfurt’s definition of BS onto social media,
to uncover what is and is not perceived as BS. We define a BS post on social media as a
claim where the poster does not care if his claim is true or false, but rather uses the post
as a story to some other effect. BS can originate from anywhere (i.e. many users post BS;
no user posts only BS), which makes it very difficult to identify. This is especially true
when considering that BS is distinct from lying [28, 92] since most BS statements are not
fact-checkable [93]. Although a series of studies suggest that humans have the ability to
identify BS [94], the volume of potential BS on social media means traditional manual
identification can fail because no service possesses the necessary human capital to label
all posts. Yet, human judgment is still the most natural approach to identify BS.
Figure 4.1: A published controversial tweet that is BS-like
†https://www.reddit.com/r/quityourbullshit/
‡http://wisdomofchopra.com/
§http://callingbullshit.org/
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Fortunately we can find footprints of human judgments left by other social media users.
One of the most common forms is a reply either using the actual word “BS” or some
statement to the same effect. Users can also leave an independent post of their own calling
BS, or even report the original post. For example, Figure 4.1 shows an an example tweet
that makes a controversial claim; in total, more than 20 unique replies “call” this tweet
out as BS. This replying behavior is an imperfect signal, but it provides the tantalizing
opportunity to uncover what is and is not perceived as BS by a large social media audience.
Hence, in this paper, we view replying behavior as evidence of a “BS call”. Replies can
help us easily track who and what have been called BS. Also, replies are often topically
motivated, meaning repliers care about the content of the post as opposed to other factors
(e.g. author of the post) [32].
Of course, there is a gap between BS-called posts and actual BS posts. Figure 4.2a
shows a posted tweet that has been called BS. The tweet praises several English politicians
(not typically controversial), yet one user replies, calling the post BS. This post is called
BS by another user, but we cannot hastily conclude whether it is “actually” BS tweets or
not. In Figure 4.2b, one user shares a piece of (unverified) sports news and another user
insists it is a useless BS. These two examples suggest the problem of BS detection is a
challenging task, even for humans.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.2: Two real posts; are either BS?
Therefore, instead of diving into the extremely nuanced task of detecting “actual” BS,
our goal is to first build a model that can automatically determine what social media posts
are likely to be called BS. We believe our work can serve as a stepping-stone to the ultimate
goal of BS detection. For instance, our results can be used to filter posts that are unlikely to
be BS from the vast social media stream. This could provide a more narrow search-space
to develop a true BS identification method.
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In order to determine which posts are likely to be called BS we focus on the audi-
ence’s perception of BS. We do this by mining how the audience perceives poster’s intent
of BS-ing through signals from the post itself. We identify four factors within a post that
influence a reader’s perception: attitude, sentiment, sincerity, and content. Attitude influ-
ences intention as part of the Theory of Planned Behavior [95, 96]. The sentiment of a post
can heavily influence the conflict surrounding it, which often results in calling BS [97, 98].
Sincerity is a measure of how much a poster cares about their claim. Since a BS-er does
not care about the factual value of the claim [28, 29], how sincere a post is perceived to be
can be a useful metric for determining how likely it is to be called BS. Finally, we examine
the contents of each post because posts on certain topics are prone to being called BS.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study on the topic of BS
and BS call on social media. But, how to prepare an appropriate dataset of BS-called
posts? Can we design an automatic model to identify posts that are likely to be called BS?
To answer these questions, the remainder of this section makes the following contributions:
• A curated crowd-sourced collection of BS-called tweets gathered over a sequence
of 100 consecutive days.
• A characterization of four factors impacting user’s perception of BS, leading to a
classification model to differentiate between posts that are more likely to be called
BS and posts that are less likely to be called BS.
• A series of experiments showing our model is capable of leveraging linguistic cues
for identifying posts are likely to be called BS, suggesting the great potential of a
preliminary BS auto-filter on social media.
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4.2 Related Work
There is a rich and growing philosophical foundation for BS. BS is described in clas-
sical philosophy. Plato’s Phaedrus explores and critiques Hellenic Sophists calling them
“non-lovers” (i.e. people who do not love the truth) [99]. Plato characterizes non-lovers as
people who believe “language is not for telling the truth”, but “for finding and strengthen-
ing positions, for gaining advantage, and for exerting influence over others” [98]. Most of
the post-modern work on BS is from Harry Frankfurt’s essay “On Bullshit” [28]. Frank-
furt lays out a basic framework for BS, its causes, and the distinction between truth, lies,
and BS. Frankfurt explains BS is unique and separate from both truth-telling and lying.
Subsequent research and studies further establish that BS-ers do not care about the factual
value of their claims, but rather care about some other effect on the audience [100, 98, 94].
Most of the existing research on BS identification is either theoretical or human-
focused. George Orwell’s essay Politics and the English Language (while not mentioning
“bullshit” specifically) describes Dying Metaphors, Operators, Verbal False Limbs, Pre-
tentious Diction, and Meaningless Words as identifiers of BS [101]. More recently, a series
of human studies by Pennycook et al. focus on the human reception of BS, and the ability
for humans to detect BS [102, 94]. The studies report that people tend to be receptive to
BS, but are still able to distinguish between BS and meaningful statements. This particular
study influenced our data collection method, which we discuss in Section 4.3.
Misbehavior on social media is a rapidly emerging field of study in the last decade [103,
104, 105, 5, 6, 106, 107, 10]. Castillo et al. build a credibility classification model [103].
Gupta et al. propose a semi-supervised credibility ranking model [105]. Popat et al. eval-
uate the credibility of textual claims on social media and other web services [106]. Lee et
al. propose a classification model for spam detection on social media [6]. Hu et al. make
use of sentiment signals in an optimization framework for social spammer detection [5].
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Zhao et al. present a method for real-time rumor detection on Twitter [10]. Cheng et
al. look into trolling behavior in the context of online discussion [104]. Rajadesingan et
al. model the “sarcasm scenario” on Twitter [107]. Ratkiewicz et al. and Ferrara et al.
study manipulated propaganda on social media [15, 108]. Hosseinmardi et al. explore
cyberbullying behavior on social media [109].
BS presents a unique scenario of misinformation on social media. By definition, BS is
a statement that does not address the facts but rather creates a narrative for some effect on
the audience. Practically, many BS statements are not fact-checkable [93]. It is important
to note that — according to Frankfurt [28, 29] — the BS-er does not simply obscure the
facts, but invents new stories to suit themselves. A BS story can be ‘true’ but still be BS
because of the author’s intent. If the author intends a story to be for some other effect
(other than relaying facts), the story can still be a BS (we will provide more details on the
characterization later on). For example, when considering a BS-like example in Figure 4.1,
we may ask, is it: Spam? Fraudulent? A rumor? Sarcasm? Propaganda? Cyberbullying?
— It seems that it does not belong to any other category other than BS. Although BS
can be roughly categorized as a type of misbehavior, we have not seen any existing work
focusing specifically on BS as it relates to social media.
4.3 Data Collection
Using Twitter’s public Stream API, we collect English tweets with the keyword “bull-
shit” (and its synonyms such as “bs”, “bull$#it”, “malarkey”, etc.) which reply to another
tweet. These are the BS-calling tweets. We then back-track and collect the tweet being
replied to (the BS-called tweet). In this study we focus on the replying behavior as the
evidence of BS calling (i.e., any BS-calling tweet must be a reply to another tweet), with
two main reasons. First, replies can help to track who and what are called BS. Second,
replies are often topically motivated, meaning the repliers care about the posts they re-
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ply [32]. A reply can appear in a “reply chain” (e.g. a reply to a reply). We only consider
those BS-called tweets which are not replying to anything other than themselves in order
to maintain the context of the BS call. In this way we can automatically gather a collection
of pairs of BS-calling tweets and BS-called tweets. These BS-called tweets are potential
BS tweets.
We use the “potential” qualifier because we cannot conclude that every BS call is
legitimate. We have seen how challenging BS identification can be, and a BS-calling tweet
is almost always somewhat subjective (i.e. dependent on the opinions and knowledge of
the BS-caller). We are aware that we may include many false positives if we rely on every
BS-calling tweet. Thus, to curate our dataset we take into account the number of BS calls
on a certain tweet. The more times a tweet gets called BS, the likelihood of the tweet
being actual BS increases. Does this assumption hold? Can a threshold of a certain called
count help identify a more “pure” set of BS tweets? Toward answering these question we
explore our data as follows.
4.3.1 Filtering the Data: BS vs. Called BS
We conduct a series of data labeling experiments to study what role called count plays
in filtering our dataset. Our collection spans a sequence of 100 consecutive days, from
April 4, 2017 to July 15, 2017. Table 4.1 provides an overview of BS-called tweets. We
can see the majority of BS-called tweets (88%) are called only once, while only a few
(1.3%) receive more than 5 BS calls.
Table 4.1: Overview of BS-called tweets
BS-called Called count = 1 Called count > 5
# Tweets 697,865 617,613 9,256
68
Next, we design a process of manual judgment to see whether we can use called count
to obtain a purer set of BS tweets. We prepare seven groups of BS-called tweets, each with
a different threshold of called count. In concrete, we create the following seven groups of
tweets:
• Group A: We randomly sample 1000 tweets without any query from Twitter’s stream-
ing pool. This dataset serves as a general sampling of the whole population of
tweets.
• Group B: We first collect all those users whose tweets have been called at least
once. Then we find their posted tweets which did not get called BS within our time
window.
• Group C: Contains all BS-called tweets whose called count is no more than 4, i.e.,
1 ≤ called count < 5.
• Group D: Includes all tweets that have been BS-called at least 5 times, i.e., called
count ≥ 5.
• Group E: Includes all tweets that have been BS-called at least 10 times, i.e., called
count ≥ 10.
• Group F: Includes all tweets that have been BS-called at least 15 times, i.e., called
count ≥ 15.
• Group G: Includes all tweets that have been BS-called at least 20 times, i.e., called
count ≥ 20.
Tweets are put into seven anonymous groups before judging them. We then randomly
sample 100 tweets from each group and ask three judges to determine if the tweets are
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BS based on their rational perception. In order to facilitate judgment the individuals were
given the same set of advice:
• A BS post is usually making an assertion about a topic. If there is no assertion (no
“story”) then it is unlikely that the tweet is BS.
• Is the topic of the assertion clear? If not then the tweet is also unlikely to be BS.
• Does the tweet provide any reasoning or support for its assertion? If not then the
tweet is likely to be BS.
• If there is evidence, is the reasoning or evidence itself BS? If so then the Tweet is
likely to be BS.
The judges are all fluent in English, without any leaning of politics or religion. Some
tweets contain links. Judges are allowed to view the external links, but are instructed to
base their judgment primarily on the content of the tweet. The judges are also allowed to
examine the users’ profiles in order to determine whether or not a user would have a bias or
reason to post BS. The judges all evaluated the tweets independently, with no knowledge
of the other’s judgments.
The judges are then asked to judge whether a tweet is BS or not, based on their percep-
tion. If the judge is uncertain then they can respond as such. In order to determine whether
a tweet is BS, we take the majority of the three responses. If there is no majority (e.g. one
’yes’, one ’no, and one ’uncertain’) a new tiebreaker judges the tweet to have a majority.
Although human-judged BS is not identical to actual BS, it can serve as a high-quality
standard of the perception of BS for our follow-up studies.
Figure 4.3 presents the results of human judgment over the seven groups of tweets
above. As expected, the identified BS tweets monotonically increase and the non-BS
tweets monotonically decrease from Group A to G. This shows that having a higher called
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Figure 4.3: Human judgment over six groups of tweets
count threshold tends to filter out more non-BS tweets. On the other hand, we don’t see
a perfect called count threshold that can give us “100% pure” BS or non-BS tweets. For
instance, less than half of the tweets in group D (i.e., being called BS at least five times)
are recognized as BS. Also, 25% of the tweets that have not been called BS (Group B)
are still identified as BS. Figure 4.4 shows two real tweets that are included in our data.
The one in Figure 4.4a is from group B and the one of Figure 4.4b is from group C. After
reading them, however, it appears that the top one is a BS tweet and the bottom one is not,
even though the former received zero BS calls and the latter got more than one BS call.
4.3.2 Problem Formulation
The observations from Figures 4.3 and 4.4 indicate that while crowd-sourced BS calls
can be indicative of BS, there is always a gap of uncertainty between posts that are called
BS and actual BS posts. Hence, our goal in this paper is to build a model that can auto-
matically identify what posts are likely to be called BS. Formally, given a post p that has
71
(a) A tweet from group B
(b) A tweet from group C
Figure 4.4: Two tweets from our dataset
been published on social media, our goal is to identify whether p is likely to be called BS
through a binary classifier c : p→ {likely BS-called, unlikely BS-called}. We require that
our model can be generalized for other social media domains even though our data in this
study is collected on Twitter. Because BS is defined as a claim [28], we also emphasize our
classification model needs to focus on the post rather than user level. The outputs of our
proposed model could be used to assess the relative BS-level of users through an analysis
of their posts.
We need to prepare two sets of tweets to train our classification model — one set
that contains posts most likely to be BS-called (the positive class) and another includes
those less likely to be BS-called (the negative class). Of course, a BS-called post is not
necessarily an actual BS post, so we want to reduce the gap in our training data as much as
possible. According to Figure 4.3, the tweets in group A have zero BS calls and more than
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95% are labeled as non-BS. In group E, F, and G are all tweets with at least 10 BS calls,
and all have more than 60% tweets that are labeled as BS. We are left with fewer tweets
as we increase the threshold of the called count, and yet the proportion of labeled BS does
not increase much. Thus, we choose the tweets of group A as the unlikely BS-called (i.e.
negative class) and the ones in group E as the likely BS-called (i.e. positive instances).
We end up with 3,370 tweets of group E and randomly sample the same amount of tweets
from group A to obtain a balanced training set.
4.4 What Tweets are Likely to be Called BS?
4.4.1 Overview
As mentioned earlier, we define a BS post on social media as a claim where the poster
does not care if his claim is true or false, but rather uses the post as a story to some other
effect. A BS post is not a human-applicable concept (i.e. no human is BS), but any BS
post is related to the person who creates it in that the person intends to post BS. According
to Frankfurt [28, 29], the BS-er does not simply obscure the facts (lie), but invents new
“facts” to suit themselves. A BS story can be modeled after the truth, but still is BS because
the author intends the story for some other effect. Hence, a key step of characterizing BS
is to find out whether the speaker (poster) cares if his story (post) is true or not.
Due to the difficulty of assessing a poster’s intention we focus on the audience’s per-
ception of a story (post). It is unrealistic to fully mine a user’s intent of posting BS —
we will never truly know what a user thinks when he posts. However, we can mine how
the audience perceives the poster’s intent (discussed in Section 4.3). But what makes the
audience “perceive” intent? The answer: signals from the post itself [102, 94].
Therefore, we focus on post-level linguistic footprints that can shed light on answer-
ing the question: what posts are more likely to be perceived as BS? We operationalize
Frankfurt’s definition of BS through an initial model of how the audience perceives what
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is and is not BS. Concretely, we extract multiple linguistic signals from a given post that
characterize the four poster-level perspectives shown in Figure 4.5:
• Attitude — Our idea is that a BS claim usually presents a strong attitude of the
speaker in order to affect the audience. This inspires us to examine the indicators of
poster’s attitude based on the writing style of a post.
• Sentiment — Since calling BS is the ultimate outcome of conflicts of stance, we
seek for verbal evidence of sentiment and opinions in a post. For example, a post
with a strong sentiment can often lead to stronger “counterforce” from the audience.
• Sincerity — According to Frankfurt, BS closely relates to understanding whether
the poster cares about the factual value of his post, which, in other words, is poster’s
sincerity. Thus, from the post we look for textual footprints of “recognizable” sin-
cerity.
• Content — BS-ers usually have a clear motivation on how and to what end they
affect the audience who also has motives for why they call a post BS. Thus, our idea
is that posts on certain subjects are prone to being called BS.
We explain the motivation and design choices for each feature throughout the remainder
of this section.
We do not explicitly include the poster’s profile as a fifth perspective, but our linguistic
features take into account audience’s perceptions on both post and poster. A user with a
large audience (e.g., millions of followers on Twitter) tends to attract more attention, as
do active posters. Yet, normalizing the count of BS call by the total number of follow-
ers or received replies will bias the results towards unpopular users. For example, in our
data we find President Trump received more than 1,000 BS calls. Thus, considering user
profiles as features can lead to an overfitted but inaccurate classifier which would lead to
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a trivial conclusion that users with many followers or posts are more likely to attract BS
calls. However, we understand that completely discounting poster-related information can
be shortsighted — some users call a social media post BS not by what it says but who says
it. Hence, we find those post-level linguistic cues that can also grasp audience’s percep-
tion on the poster. For instance, the perspective of attitude indicates the poster’s writing
style. Sentiment captures the poster’s strength of stance. Sincerity directly connects to
the poster’s mental process while writing. Content can reveal poster’s motivation of post-
ing BS. These linguistic signals are based on the post but they all influence on audience’s
perception of the poster’s intention.
Figure 4.5: Four perspectives characterizing what posts are likely to be perceived as BS
4.4.2 Attitude
In order to impact the audience’s perception, a BS claim usually reveals a strong atti-
tude of the BS-er. Attitude, intention, and perception are three cornerstones of the Theory
of Planned Behavior in psychology [95, 110]. It states that attitude toward behavior, sub-
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jective norms, and perceived behavioral control, together shape an individual’s behavioral
intentions and behaviors [95, 96]. This inspires us to examine the writing style of a post
that indicate the poster’s attitude.
BS tends to be highly subjective and arbitrarily assertive [97, 29, 98]. In order to af-
fect the audience, BS-ers usually express their subjective feelings or viewpoints with an
assertive attitude. In contrast, a typical non-BS (such as scientific articles) usually cau-
tiously report observations. A claim based on a baseless presupposition or preconception
is generally seen as less reliable by the audience [98]. Thus, we focus on specific words
in a post that reflect subjectivity and assertiveness. For example, assertive verbs (e.g., “as-
sure”, “insist”) show the level of assertiveness; report verbs (e.g., “deny”, “show”) and
implicative words (e.g., “dare”, “preclude”) represent the attitude toward preconception.
Mitigating words (e.g., “maybe”, “possible”) soften the commitment of an assertion.
For feature extraction we build a collection of lexicons that have been widely used
in other literature [111, 112, 113, 114, 115]. Given a social media post we extract the
number of terms occurring in each lexicon (after parsing and stemming). To validate our
intuition, for each feature we compare the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the
positive tweets and the negative tweets prepared in Section 4.3. Figure 4.6 shows the CDF
comparisons for the number of subjective words and assertive verbs. We find those more
likely called tweets tend to contain more subjective words and assertive verbs. The median
number of subjective words in the positive class is 2.3 while for the negative class it is 1.6.
Half of all positive tweets have at least one assertive verb but almost 70% of the negative
tweets do not include any assertive verb. We have similar observations for report verbs and
implicative words. In the case of mitigating words, the trend is reversed: 14% negative
instances have at least one mitigating word while only 8% positive tweets include one.
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(a) Subjective words
(b) Assertive verbs
Figure 4.6: Likely called vs. unlikely called: subjectivity and assertiveness
4.4.3 Sentiment
Sentiment plays an import role in the perception of BS. This is especially true in sit-
uations where calling BS is the ultimate outcome of conflicts of stance. Posts that are
opinionated or have a distinctive bias are more likely to evoke disagreements with oth-
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ers. A stronger sentiment in the post can often result in the stronger “counterforce” from
the audience, which is prevalent in BS calling [97, 98]. In contrast, a post with neutral
sentiment is usually not divisive, so the likelihood of a neutral post being called BS is
lower. Hence, we rate the “strength of sentiment” for a post via seeking verbal evidence
of sentiment and opinions.
There are many lexicons of words that indicate bias, opinion, and sentiment. We com-
bine six different lexicons. First, we applied the SentiStrength sentiment lexicon which
focuses on “short, informal texts,” rating each word from -5 (very negative) to 5 (very pos-
itive) [116]. Then we applied AFINN which “is a list of English words rated for valence”
with a range of [−5, 5] [117]. Next we applied the MPQA Subjectivity (MPQA-S) and
the MPQA-Effect (MPQA-E) Lexicons. The MPQA-S lexicon contains a word and the
subjective feeling which it implies, which can be either positive or negative [118]. The
MPQA-E lexicon provides each word with the effect on the overall sentence: ‘+Effect’
or ‘-Effect’ [119]. We also applied the UIC lexicon which has positive and negative sen-
timent annotations for 6,800 words [120]. Finally, we added the SenticNet 4 sentiment
lexicon which also provides ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ annotations for each word [121].
All of these lexicons provide a score for each word. However, all scores do not nec-
essarily agree. In order to account for the disagreement of our lexicons, we combine the
scores of all of the lexicons and take the proportion of negative scores for each word and
the proportion of positive scores for each word and treat them as separate entities. This
maintains the “strength” of sentiment within a word. If a word has more disagreements,
it is more ambiguous (score closer to 0). Whereas, if a word has fewer disagreements it
conveys a strong unipolar sentiment (score closer to 1).
In order to score an entire tweet we combine the scores for each word by taking the
total negative and positive scores over the sum of the negative and positive scores. Let S
be the set of positive and negative scores for each word in a tweet. Let sp be the positive
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score of a word and sn be the negative score of a word. We calculate two measures Tp and
Tn as the following:
rp =
∑
sp∈S
sp, rn =
∑
sn∈S
sn
Tp =
rp
rp + rn
, Tn =
rn
rp + rn
.
Tp and Tn maintain the strength of sentiment for each tweet because we take the propor-
tion of positivity and negativity to the total sentiment. In this way, a tweet with strong
sentiment has positive and negative scores that are vastly different, while a neutral tweet
has a positive and negative scores that are closer together.
4.4.4 Sincerity
As discussed, BS characterization closely relates to understanding whether the poster
cares about the factual value of what he posts; in other words, poster’s sincerity. Here the
definition of sincerity is limited to the context of posting. In order to extract the user’s
sincerity from the post itself, we look for the textual footprints of “recognizable” sincerity.
We consider two popular concepts in psychological content analysis — cognition and
readability.
The cognitive process behind a text post is important. Analyzing the psychological
content in a text can help understand its author’s mental process while writing. Frankfurt
explains that a BS-er often intends to BS [122], which leads us to examine the cognition
behind each post. We use the Regressive Imagery Dictionary (RID) which identifies pri-
mordial conceptual content. The RID returns the percentage of the primary, secondary,
and emotional thought present in text [123]. Primary thought is generally free-form asso-
ciative thinking involved in dreams and fantasy. Secondary thought is focused on logical,
reality-based problem solving. Emotional thoughts are expressions of of fear, sadness,
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hate, affection, etc. We collect each as an independent feature through the implementation
of NodeBox English Linguistics [124].
The readability of a post is also important to the author’s sincerity. Readability is the
measure of the approximate level of education necessary to understand a post. The amount
of education necessary to understand a post is an important consideration because the less
readable a post is (the higher the level of education needed to understand the post), the
more it is associated with misbehavior (e.g. deception) [125]. Although credibility and
BS are not the same, the research literature has observed a strong association between
them [97, 29, 98]. Measuring readability is challenging when it comes to social media
due to the brevity of posts, especially since most readability formulas require a mini-
mum sentence count. In order to compensate for this we perform a series of readability
tests (Flesch-Kincaid Grade, Coleman-Liau, Automated Readability, Linsear Write, and
Gunning-Fog) [126, 127, 128, 129, 130]. We use their scores (measured in U.S. grade-
levels [131]) as independent features.
4.4.5 Content
Posts on certain subjects are prone to being called BS. BS-ers usually have a clear
motivation on how and to what end they want to affect their audience. The audience also
has motives for why they call a post BS. For example, a Pinterest post introducing a recipe
for baked salmon is less likely to be called BS (or to even be BS in the first place). On the
contrary, a Facebook post by a partisan news outlet reporting a revised health-care bill is
more likely to ignite many disputes.
We search for hints of content shift in our prepared likely BS-called and unlikely BS-
called tweets. Twitter does not provide explicit topical information for each tweet and it is
unrealistic to manually label all tweets. With the idea that a user on social media usually
posts with a single focus (usually what she is interested or good at), we investigate the clues
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of poster’s topical profile. We leverage Twitter Lists, a large publicly-accessible collection
of crowd-contributed user tagging. Twitter Lists allows users to label each other with a
tag, e.g. politics, sports, art, etc. We query list memberships for each user in our data via
the Twitter API. Finding many nonsense tags and near-synonyms, we manually compile a
leaner list of the 200 most popular tags by filtering out nonsense and merging variants (e.g.
excluding “cool-people”; merging “breaking-news” and “noticias” into “news”). Note that
the derivation of these tags is completely independent from the formation of BS and calling
BS.
Next, for each tweet we count how many times its poster is labeled by a tag related
to politics. We choose politics in the first place because politics-related content is usually
controversial [132] which — as we have discussed — are favorites of BS callers and BS-
ers. Figure 4.7 shows the CDFs for posters of likely BS-called posts and unlikely BS-called
posts. We see a big difference: more than 60% of the posters of likely BS-called tweets
are tagged at least once with politics-related tags as their topic focus and more than 20%
are labeled at least 50 times; but almost 80% posters of unlikely BS-called tweets have
not been tagged with “politics.” Similarly we observed posts whose authors are tagged
by “entertainment news” are more likely to be called BS compared to users who focus on
“technology” or “art”.
All of these observations imply some content is more likely to be perceived as BS than
other content. However, our classification model would lose the generality if we only pres-
elect certain tags as the “vulnerable topics” and exclude the others. Hence, we should avoid
directly using the measure in Figure 4.7 as a feature of our model. But how can we capture
the topical distribution only based on the text of a social media post? Recent advances in
distributed text representation learning have offered effective text embedding methods that
capture syntactic and semantic features [133]. In this way, for each post we have a “vector
of content” without specifying the topics so that all nuances of content difference can be
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Figure 4.7: Likely called vs. unlikely called: politics-related poster
captured in the same high-dimension space. We train a word embedding model with the
whole collection of text posts using the popular implementation Word2Vec,¶ and average
the learned latent vectors of term as features for each post. Parameters such as window
size and dimensionality are empirically determined.
4.5 Experiments
4.5.1 Data Exploratory Analysis
We perform a series of data exploratory analyses in order to know more about our
data. First, we attempt to have a better idea of who has been called BS the most. Next, we
explore what topics users who are called BS mostly post about. Finally, we explore where
BS called tweets and BS calls originate.
Who are called BS the most? This is one of the most natural questions to ask given the
whole dataset. To answer this, we rank all users by two metrics. We first rank them by
how many of their unique tweets have been called BS, regardless of how many times they
¶https://www.tensorflow.org/tutorials/word2vec
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have been called. The top-10 accounts are shown in Figure 4.8a. Next we rank them by
the number of unique tweets that have been called at least 5 times, shown in Figure 4.8b.
This metric allows us to examine more closely which users may be actually BS-ing more
than others due to the increased purity of the dataset (as discussed in Section 4.3).
(a) Top 10 accounts with unique tweets called BS at least once
(b) Top 10 accounts with unique tweets called BS ≥ 5 times
Figure 4.8: Accounts that have been called BS the most
We see nearly all of these users have a close connection to politics. “Fox News” has
4,239 tweets that have been called BS, and 553 of them have been called BS more than 5
times. “CNN” has 3,976 tweets being called at least once. “The Hill” is a newspaper
covering the U.S. Congress and Presidency which has been called 4,022 times. Sean
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Hannity is a “conservative political commentator” who is employed by Fox News. Paul
Ryan is the current Speaker of the United States House of Representatives. Bill Mitchell
is a YouTube and talk show personality. Another observation is the ranking in Figure 4.8a
mostly contains news outlets while the ranking in Figure 4.8b includes more individuals
related to politics. This could mean that in spite of the fact individuals tend to post fewer
tweets than news organizations, important political figures attract more BS calls.
What is called BS the most? A challenging task is to create a representation of the topic
focuses of all the posts that are called BS in our dataset. In other words, what topics have
been called BS? This gives us a better understanding of what topics are likely to evoke BS
calls. Since it is challenging (and potentially noise inducing) to manually label thousands
of users, we instead leverage Twitter Lists as discussed in Section 4.4.5. There is no set
limit on how many tags a user can be labeled with or how many times they can be labeled
with that tag. We collect the tags and choose the mode as the representative tag for each
user, leaving each account with one topic focus.
Figure 4.9: Top focuses of users with BS-called tweets
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Figure 4.9 presents the distribution of tags over all of the users who had at least one
unique tweet called BS at least once. The largest category is “politics,” followed closely
by “entertainment.” Politics has been a scrutinized subject recently especially since the
controversial 2016 United States Presidential Election. Politics has also been previously
identified as a hub for BS-related activity [122, 17]. The entertainment industry is no-
torious for spreading many dramatized and invented stories (i.e. BS) [134], so it is not
surprising to see that many entertainment-centric users have been called BS. The whole
distribution shows the dominance of politics, entertainment, and news outlets as the most
common users that are called BS. This makes sense considering all of these users are pri-
marily spreading information which — as we discussed previously — they are not held
accountable for.
Where do callers and their targets come from? Location is a fundamental demographic
for any population. We want to investigate the geographic distribution of callers as to
whom they are calling. To this end, we ask: Where do callers and their targets come from?
In order to answer this question we leverage the information found in each tweet as well
as the account which posted the tweet. We gather the geographic (latitude and longitude)
information from each tweet if available, otherwise we extract the location mentioned
in the description provided by users themselves (after manually filtering out nonsensical
locations). We focus on the United States in this study.
Figure 4.10a is a heat map showing the geographic distribution of tweets called BS.
A large portion of tweets that are called BS are from three states — Washington D.C.
(plotted as a part of Virginia), New York (NY), and California (CA). Many politicians,
news outlets, and celebrities — all of which are targets of BS-calls (as discussed) —
reside in these three states. This geographic distribution seems to confirm the analysis
in Figure 4.9. Many of the BS-ers are labeled as “politics” and most of them also are
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(a) BS-called tweets
(b) BS-calling tweets
Figure 4.10: Geographic distributions of BS-called tweets and BS calling tweets
based in Washington D.C. Figure 4.10b shows the distribution of tweets calling BS. We
find two distinct differences when comparing this distribution to Figure 4.10a. First, not
many callers come from DC. Second, the distribution of BS-callers is more reminiscent
of the Unites States’ general population distribution [135]. These observations seem to
point to the fact that BS-calling tweets (and BS-callers in general) are unclustered and
representative of the population distribution of the United States.
We have observed that many BS-called tweets are based in Washington D.C. and many
BS-callers are based in CA and NY. We aim to determine whether or not the general
political leaning of a location has an impact on the BS callers in that area. To answer
this question, we carry out a case study on the 2016 Presidential Election. To begin we
collect all of the tweets which are posted by President Trump and called BS and plot the
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distribution of all tweets calling Trump’s posts BS. To avoid bias toward states with bigger
populations, we normalize the number of callers in a state by that state’s actual population
density [135].
(a) BS calls of Trump’s tweets
(b) Clinton’s supporters in 2016 Election
Figure 4.11: Geographic distributions of Trump’s BS calls and Clinton’s supporters
Figure 4.11b is the normalized geographic distribution of Trump’s BS-callers. We
find most of the regions saturated with Donald Trump’s BS-called tweets are traditionally
Democratic-voting states. Figure 4.11a is the density of votes cast for Hillary Clinton
in the 2016 presidential election.‖ We clearly see a relationship between the geographic
‖http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37889032
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distributions of Trump’s callers and Clinton’s supporters.
4.5.2 Classification
We are ready to build a classification model considering all the four perspectives in-
troduced in Section 4.4. To choose appropriate classification algorithms, we prefer that:
(i) the algorithm has been widely used and maturely implemented; and (ii) we need to test
on a variety of representatives. Concretely, we choose four well-known classification al-
gorithms with different theoretical foundations: logistic regression (linear model), random
forest (tree-based ensemble), support vector machine (kernel function), and multi-layer
perception (neutral network). We abbreviate them LR, RF, SVM, and MLP, respectively.
We also alter various settings of each classification algorithm. For instance, we test
two split criteria in RF (Gini impurity and information gain), four solvers in LR (Newton-
CG [136], L-BFGS [137], LIBLINEAR [138], stochastic average gradient [139]), four
kernels in SVM (linear, polynomial, RBF, sigmoid), four activation functions in MLP
(sigmoid, tanh, relu, identity), and three solvers in MLP (L-BFGS, stochastic gradient
descent, ADAM [140]). We also test standardization and implement feature selection based
on F-value or Chi-square (if applicable). To evaluate, we do 10-fold cross validation
over the 6,740 tweets (3,370 for each class) prepared in Section 4.3. We measure the
classification performance by three popular metrics: micro-averaged F1, macro-averaged
F1, and macro-averaged AUC of ROC curve.
Table 4.2 shows the results (95% confidence interval (CI)) of three metrics over four
algorithms and four feature sets introduced in Section 4.4. For each algorithm we report
the best performance among all tested settings. We draw several observations from Ta-
ble 4.2. Horizontally, SVM and MLP tend to outperform the other two in general, and in
some cases the differences are statistically significant. For instance, SVM and MLP work
equally well across all three metrics, and they significantly outperform RF in most cases.
88
Table 4.2: Classification performances (95% CIs) over four algorithms and five feature
sets
Feature Set F1 Macro (mean ± margin of error)LR RF SVM MLP
Attitude 0.641 (0.007) 0.633 (0.011) 0.639 (0.008) 0.643 (0.008)
Sentiment 0.665 (0.004) 0.620 (0.010) 0.665 (0.007) 0.670 (0.008)
Sincerity 0.713 (0.010) 0.708 (0.006) 0.724 (0.009) 0.728 (0.009)
Content 0.707 (0.012) 0.710 (0.010) 0.715 (0.010) 0.733 (0.009)
Together 0.790 (0.007) 0.770 (0.008) 0.798 (0.011) 0.797 (0.008)
Feature Set F1 Micro (mean ± margin of error)LR RF SVM MLP
Attitude 0.641 (0.007) 0.634 (0.010) 0.640 (0.008) 0.643 (0.007)
Sentiment 0.665 (0.004) 0.621 (0.006) 0.665 (0.007) 0.668 (0.007)
Sincerity 0.713 (0.009) 0.705 (0.008) 0.725 (0.009) 0.726 (0.009)
Content 0.707 (0.012) 0.711 (0.010) 0.716 (0.010) 0.733 (0.008)
Together 0.790 (0.007) 0.770 (0.008) 0.798 (0.011) 0.796 (0.010)
Feature Set AUC (mean ± margin of error)LR RF SVM MLP
Attitude 0.690 (0.010) 0.679 (0.013) 0.690 (0.011) 0.691 (0.011)
Sentiment 0.721 (0.006) 0.660 (0.009) 0.721 (0.006) 0.724 (0.007)
Sincerity 0.785 (0.010) 0.772 (0.010) 0.785 (0.010) 0.796 (0.009)
Content 0.787 (0.012) 0.784 (0.010) 0.804 (0.012) 0.817 (0.010)
Together 0.867 (0.008) 0.848 (0.009) 0.876 (0.008) 0.878 (0.007)
The neural network model MLP, having been a rising power this decade, works consis-
tently well for our task. Vertically, we find features of sincerity and content statistically
work better than those of attitude and sentiment. Sincerity is the measure of how much
a person “cares” or how genuine they are about what they are talking about. This plays
into their intention, so it makes sense that this feature set works great. Similarly — as
we have discussed in Section 4.4.5 — the content of a post connects to the motivations
of both BS-ing and calling BS, so it is consistent with our observations to see this feature
set working well. Besides, we find the RID to be a very telling feature, especially because
it allows us to peer into the cognition of the post. Readability also increases the results
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of our classifier, due to its direct effect on perception. Sentiment encapsulates only one
portion of perception, so it works better in conjunction with other features.
We always see noticeable improvement as we consider all types of feature sets together.
For example, SVM outputs a 95% CI of F1 Micro 0.798 ± 0.011 when considering all
features together. The highest AUC scores we have achieved is 0.878 ± 0.007, when we
apply the neural network model and consider all four aspects at the same time. These
promising results show the effectiveness of our classifier that leverages linguistic cues
to identify likely BS-called posts and the great potential of serving as a preliminary BS
auto-filter on social media.
4.6 Summary
BS has become a prominent societal issue, especially in this social media driven time.
BS identification can be very tricky for even humans, so we focus on BS-calling and the
perception of BS on social media as a stepping-stone. In this dissertation we build a system
that automatically determines what social media posts are likely to be called BS. First, we
gather a curated crowd-sourced collection of BS-called tweets from Twitter over a 100
day period. Next, we argue that while it is difficult to assess a poster’s intent of posting
BS, we can mine the audience’s perceptions of the poster’s intent. We introduce four
perspectives – attitude, sentiment, sincerity, and content – that can be leveraged through a
set of linguistic footprints which we extract from each post. Our data-driven exploration
of this curated dataset finds who and what topics have been called BS the most, and where
BS callers and their targets come from. Finally, we develop a classification model that
uses the four perspectives to differentiate between posts that are likely to be called BS and
posts that are not. The results show the promising potential of our system as a preliminary
BS discovery tool on social media.
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5. A CROSS-CUTTING COMPONENT: LEARNING USER TOPICAL PROFILES∗
In the previous three sections we have studied three concrete applications against three
user misbehaviors on social media — spamming, manipulation, and distortion. As dis-
cussed in Section 1, all these applications of user misbehavior relate to the question of
who those users are. With the aim of better understanding the relationship between users
and misbehavior, we identify the problem of learning user topical profile on social media
as a cross-cutting component that can improve our understanding of each specific misbe-
havior (while also providing the foundation for a number of other studies). Hence, we turn
in this section to propose a generalized framework for learning user topical profiles, as
follows.
5.1 Introduction
In social media systems, demographic profiles — often including name, age, gender,
and location — provide an important first step toward creating rich user models for in-
formation personalization. For example, a user’s location can be a signal to surface local
content in the Facebook newsfeed. These demographic profiles typically reveal very lit-
tle about a user’s topical interests (what she likes) or expertise (what she is known for).
Hence, there is great effort toward building high-quality user topical profiles, toward im-
proving user experience and powering important applications like personalized web search
[33], recommendation system [34, 35], expert mining [36], and community detection [37].
Indeed, there are two major approaches to build the topical profiles for social media
users. One thread of methods seeks to uncover latent factors that may be descriptive of a
∗Part of this section is reprinted with permission from "What Are You Known For?: Learning User
Topical Profiles with Implicit and Explicit Footprints" by Cao C., Ge H., Lu H., Hu X., and Caverlee J. In:
Proceedings of the 40th International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research and Development in Information
Retrieval (SIGIR ’17). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 743-752. Copyright 2017 by ACM.
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user. For example, running Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) over a user’s posts in social
media can reveal the topics of interest of the user [141, 142, 143]; similarly, matrix factor-
ization approaches have proven popular at capturing user factors, often for personalization
purposes [144, 145, 146, 35, 33, 147, 148]. Aside from such recommendation applica-
tions, latent factor models have also been used to find influential users, mine communities,
and predict review quality [149, 143, 37]. Another thread of methods seeks to encourage
social media users to directly assess each other’s interests and expertise, providing a par-
tial perspective on user topical profiles. For example, LinkedIn users can choose skill tags
for their own profiles and can endorse these tags on the profiles of others. Twitter Lists
allow users to organize others according to user-selected keywords, e.g., placing a group
of popular chefs on the list “Top Chefs”. In this way, some list names can be viewed as a
topical tag for list members. In the aggregate, this crowd-contributed tagging knowledge
can be viewed as explicit evidence for capturing user interests and expertise [150, 36, 151].
Both approaches, however, face great challenges. Approaches that identify latent top-
ics (often, as a distribution over features in some lower dimensional space) are typically
trained only over content (ignoring other important footprints) and are difficult to directly
interpret. Methods that only use crowdsourced tags typically suffer from limited coverage;
that is, while the hand-curated tags may be of high-quality, very few users actually have
descriptive topical tags associated with them. For example, in a random sample of 3.5 mil-
lion Twitter users, we find that only 2% have been labeled with a topical tag (more details
in Section 5.5). Moreover, to better understand user topical interests and expertise, a more
comprehensive profiling framework is necessary. For instance, it is unclear what kind of
evidence is useful for user topical profiling. And how can such potentially heterogeneous
evidence be modeled for user topical profiling?
Hence, we propose to exploit heterogeneous footprints (e.g., tags, friends, interests,
behavior) for intelligently learning user topical profiles. Based on a small set of explicit
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user tags, our goal is to extend this known set to the wider space of users who have no
explicit tags. The key intuition is to identify “similar” users in terms of their topical
profiles by exploiting their similarity in a footprint space. For instance, Twitter users who
post similar hashtags may have similar interests, and YouTube users who upvote the same
videos may have similar preferences. Such evidence of homophily has been widely studied
in the sociological literature [38] and repeatedly observed in online social media, e.g.,
[39, 40, 41, 42, 43]. But what footprint spaces are appropriate for finding this homophily?
What impact do they have on the discovery of user topical profiles? And which footprints
are more effective at uncovering topical profiles?
Toward answering these questions, the rest of this section makes the following main
contributions:
• First, we formulate the problem of learning user topical profiles in social media,
with a focus on leveraging heterogeneous footprints.
• Second, we demonstrate how to model different footprints (e.g., like interests, social,
and behavioral footprints) under this framework, and we present a unified 2-D fac-
torization model in which we simultaneously consider all of these footprints (called
UTop).
• Third, we then extend this initial approach through a generalized model that inte-
grates the pairwise relations across all potential footprints via a tensor-based model
(called UTop+), which provides a more robust framework for user profile learning.
• Finally, through extensive experiments, we find the proposed UTop+ model is capa-
ble of learning high-quality user topical profiles, and leads to a 10-15% improvement
in precision and mean average error versus a state-of-the-art baseline. We find that
behavioral footprints are the single strongest factor, but that intelligent integration
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of multiple footprints leads to the best overall performance.
5.2 Related Work
Finding User Interests and Expertise. Finding user interests and expertise has numerous
applications, and one of the most popular tasks is personalized search and recommenda-
tion. Considerable research [34, 144, 146, 35, 142, 33, 152, 148] has been dedicated to
uncover users’ latent interests or expertise as their personal preferences for building rec-
ommender systems in different domains, such as web search [142, 33], web content [148],
rating systems [153, 35], and social media [144, 145, 146, 152].
For social media research, the latent factor model is a state-of-the-art method for user
recommendation. Interpreting the latent factors as topics, approaches based on such a
model usually avoid explicitly identifying user interests but instead integrate the factors
into a recommendation task. For example, Hong et al. applied matrix factorization on
both users and tweets and focused on recommending user’s retweeting behavior [145].
Similarly, Jiang et al. presented a probabilistic matrix factorization method to recommend
whether a user adopts an item on a social network [146]. Zhong et al. collected user’s
webpage views to build a matrix factorization profile for web content recommendation
[148].
Leveraging Footprints. A sequence of research has focused on using various footprints
to learn user interests. One of the most traditional approaches is to model text-based foot-
prints to obtain users’ latent topical preferences, as in the case of PLSA and LDA [154,
155, 143, 37]. Another popular footprint is social (often via friendships) [146, 156, 157],
with the natural homophily assumption that friends tend to have similar profiles. In ad-
dition, behavioral footprints have become a newer factor; for example, Guy et al. used a
user’s tagging behavior as evidence for content recommendation [34]. Lappas et al. con-
sidered user endorsement as a behavioral signal [158]. In [152], Zhao et al. focused on the
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behaviors of commenting, “+1”, and “like” on Google+. Some of the other footprints that
have been explored in previous works include user’s emotions and sentiment, geo-location,
temporal context and linguistic activity. For example, Hu et al. [159, 160] proposed an un-
supervised factorization approach for user sentiment analysis through emotional signals.
Lu et al. [161] considered user’s geographical footpints to discover what people are known
for. Yin et al. [147] proposed a probabilistic graphical method to model user’s temporal
interest for item recommendation. Hu et al. [162] applied a factorization method to infer
linguistic properties of user’s documents. However, typically, these different footprints
have been treated separately.
Factorization Models. Technically, it is challenging to embed users’ heterogeneous foot-
prints into a factorization model. A handful of studies have adopted a regularization model
[163, 149, 35] for personalized recommendation, though typically focusing on only one
footprint. In [153], latent spaces are learned separately for each footprint through prob-
ablisitc matrix factorization assuming they are not independent. Tensor-based factoriza-
tion methods [164, 165] have been used in many applications such as behavior modeling,
healthcare, and urban planning [166, 167, 168]. A more comprehensive survey of tensor
factorization and its applications can be found in [169]. In contrast, we first propose a
factorization model in which we simultaneously consider multiple contexts via linearly
weighted regularization. We then extend the model with a generalized tensor-based fac-
torization so that not only different types of footprints can be considered together but their
multi-linear interactions with each other can be exploited.
Several studies have focused on heterogeneous domains or entities, instead of contexts.
Yu et al. put mutiple types of entities into a heterogeneous network and used a Bayesian
ranking process to estimate user preferences [170]. Similarly, Hu et al. looked into a tradi-
tional user-item recommendation problem, presenting a factorization model across hetero-
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geneous items. However, the network will quickly grow when users and items increase.
Singh and Gordon proposed a framework to learn different types of relations, where they
iteratively do matrix factorization between all pairs of domains [171]. Hu et al. [172]
adopted the existing PARAFAC2 factorization algorithm on a tensor model, which is ob-
tained by combining user ratings of different merchandises like book, music, and movie.
Zhong et al. [148] directly applies a matrix factorization model on Web users and their
clicked content items. However, in this work, we focus on learning user topical profiles
rather than recommending item ratings for users.
Personalized Tag Recommendation. Another related research line focuses on person-
alized tag recommendation for users in social tagging systems [173, 174, 175, 176, 177,
178]. For example, Rendle et al. [175, 176] proposed tensor factorization to suggest tags
to users for annotation on different items. Feng et al. [173] modeled social tagging as a
multi-type graph and proposed random walk with restart for tag recommendation. Konstas
et al. [174] also proposed a modified random walk with restart by exploiting social rela-
tionships and tagging for item recommendation. Our work is different from personalized
tag recommendation in two aspects. The first is that we use crowdsourced tags to represent
user’s interests and expertise instead of annotating items in social systems. The second is
that our problem is to infer users’ topical profiles through tags for unknown users based
on their different footprints rather than recommend tags based on partial knowledge of a
user’s profile.
5.3 Preliminaries
Explicit Footprints. Let U = {u1, u2, . . . , uN} be a set of users where N is the number
of users, and T = {t1, t2, . . . , tM} is a set of M tags each of which is associated with a
particular topic. Suppose we have a subset of users S ⊂ U where each user ui ∈ S has
been labeled with a subset of T , typically based on the collective efforts of the crowd. We
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refer to such labels as explicit footprints. Practical examples of explicit footprints include
LinkedIn Skill Tags and Twitter Lists, wherein users can provide a crowdsourced summary
of a user’s interests and expertise [150, 36, 151]. We denote the explicit footprints as the
user-tag matrix P ∈ R|S|×M in which element P (i, j) represents the number of times ui
is labeled by tj .
Learning User Topical Profiles. Given a set of users U , a set of tags T , and a subset of
users S ⊂ U for whom we know their user topical profiles P , the problem of Learning
User Topical Profiles is the task of inferring the unknown tags from T for users in U −S.
An Initial Attempt with Explicit Footprints Only. A natural choice for attacking the
challenge of learning user topical profiles is the matrix completion approach, which has
been adopted in many related works [145, 171, 170, 148]. Under a matrix completion
approach, we can extend P to a larger matrix X ∈ RN×M by including all users of U .
Then, we can formulate the learning user topical profiles problem as a matrix completion
problem:
min
U ,V
1
2
‖Ω (X −UV T )‖2F ,
s. t. U ≥ 0,V ≥ 0,
(5.1)
where X is a user-tag matrix, and U ∈ RN×K and V ∈ RM×K are latent representations
of users and tags, respectively. K  min(N,M) is the number of latent dimensions.
Since the given X is naturally non-negative, we add the same constraints for U and V so
that we can better interpret the values in them. Ω is a non-negative matrix with the same
size of X:
Ω(i, j) =

1 if X(i, j) is observed,
0 if X(i, j) is unobserved.
The basic matrix completion model above learns an optimal set of {U , V } to approx-
imate the original matrix X , estimating for unobserved users through observed user-tag
97
pairs. However, as in many linear-inverse problems, there may not be sufficient infor-
mation to estimate the original matrix X based only on the partially observed data. The
problem of learning user topical profiles is one such case, since most of our target users
do not have any partially explicit footprint.
Implicit Footprints. With the scarcity of explicit footprints in mind, we are interested
to explore the potential of implicit footprints for learning unknown user topical profiles.
Implicit footprints may indirectly reflect user interests or expertise. Typical implicit foot-
prints, for example, could include user behaviors, the social circle of a user, sentiment-
based features of a user’s posts, the geo-location of a user, emotional cues, and temporal
dynamics, among many others [34, 159, 160, 162, 146, 158, 161, 156, 157, 147, 152]. The
key intuition is to identify “similar” users in terms of their topical profiles by exploiting
their similarity via these implicit footprints. Since evidence from these heterogeneous im-
plicit footprints may provide conflicting evidence, potentially leading to lower quality user
profiles than considering footprints in isolation, we propose a generalized optimization
framework that takes into account pairwise relations among all possible implicit footprints
for learning user profiles. In this way, the benefits of each footprint may be intelligently
combined to find the best evidence across multiple implicit footprints for learning high-
quality user profiles.
5.4 Learning User Topical Profiles
We turn in this section to propose a generalized model for learning user topical profiles.
We first identify multiple implicit footprints and demonstrate how to model them. We
then introduce a matrix factorization based approach — called UTop, before extending
this version to a more general tensor-based approach — called UTop+.
98
Bob sports, basketball, game
David
sports-relevant tags
“NBA all-star game 2016! Vote Kobe!!”
“All-star 2016 @Toronto! Cant wait!!! Vote!”
This time it’s Kobe’s last NBA all-star game!
I’ll vote Curry for all-star 2016 starting PG!
“Tired!!!”
“night every1”
“@abc hello?”
“feel good!”
?
(a) Text-based Interest Footprint
“Hillary Clinton won New Hampshire huffingtonpost.com/politics”
Alice politics, journalist, news
Carol
politics-relevant tags
“huffingtonpost.com/politics David Brooks: I miss Barack Obama”
“Sanders could be the nominee? huffingtonpost.com/politics”
“huffingtonpost.com/politics 10 reasons Rubio will win nomination”
(b) Behavioral Footprint
Figure 5.1: Examples of different implicit footprints on learning user topical profiles
5.4.1 Modeling Implicit Footprints
We aim to integrate many different kinds of implicit footprints into the framework for
learning user topical profiles. For the concreteness in our discussion, we focus in this sec-
tion on three specific types of implicit footprints that capture three different perspectives
on user topical profiles. The three footprints are: social, based on the friends (via the social
graph) around the user; interest, based on the text posts made by the user; and behavioral,
based on the link sharing activities of the user. The intuition is that these varied implicit
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footprints can connect related users, such that user topical profiles can be propagated from
user to user. But how should we model these kinds of implicit footprints? And how can
we integrate them into a matrix completion model? Note that the proposed model can be
easily extended to incorporate additional footprints.
Social Footprints. Social footprints — directly suggested by homophily — naturally
indicate that connected users may share common interests, and hence can be used for
inferring user topical profiles [34, 146, 156, 157]. For example, if Carol and David are
following each other on Twitter, the social footprint suggests that it is more likely for them
to share common interests.
These social network connections between users can be naturally modeled as a matrix.
We denote the matrix asE ∈ RN×N in which the binary element E(i, j) represents if user
ui and user uj have a connection on a social network. We can model this social footprint
as a regularization term:
L1 = 1
2
‖E −UUT‖2F .
Our goal is to optimize the user latent matrix U in order to minimize L1, with the
intuition that friends are likely to have similar profiles. Of course, users may form rela-
tionships in social media for many diverse reasons, and so these relationships may not be
appropriate for inferring similar topical profiles. As one example, family members may be
“friends” in a social network but can have distinct topical profiles (e.g., sister vs brother,
grandson vs grandfather). Hence, we next consider additional implicit footprints that may
serve to mitigate these challenges.
Interest Footprints. The second footprint we consider is based on user interests. Texts
posted by users can semantically reflect related subjects associated with their interests or
expertise. Thus, many studies have directly applied LDA on posted texts, assuming the
(latent) topics in user’s posts are their topical profiles [141, 142, 143]. In Figure 5.1a,
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Alice is a basketball fan and she has posted many tweets talking about the upcoming NBA
all-star game. We find Bob’s tweets share many of the same words as Alice’s. Hence, their
posted texts demonstrate their shared interests in basketball, suggesting that Alice’s user
topical profile may be similar to Bob’s.
We can model this text-based interest footprint like so: let w = {w1, w2, . . . , wL} be
the set of words, where L denotes the number of words. A ∈ RN×L is a user-word matrix
in which A(i, j) is the frequency of word wj appearing in user ui’s posts. Similarly,
B ∈ RM×L is a tag-word matrix where B(i, j) represents the frequency of word wj
posted by all users who have tag ti. We propose to leverage a user’s interest footprint as
the following loss function:
L2 = 1
2
‖A−UW T‖2F +
1
2
‖B − VW T‖2F ,
whereW ∈ RL×K represents word’s latent topics. Our goal is to minimize L2 so that two
users who are “nearby” in the interest footprint space tend to have similar topical profiles.
However, a user’s posts are often short (like on Twitter) and may contain many nonsense
or off-topic texts, which can interfere with clearly revealing user topical profiles. Hence,
we next turn to a third footprint for overcoming these issues.
Behavioral Footprints. Finally, we propose to augment the social and textual footprints
with behavioral footprints [34, 158, 152]. According to the homophily evidence in the
behavior dimension [38], for instance, two YouTube users may have close tastes if they
usually “like” or “dislike” the same videos. A retweet on Twitter is a strong indication
of the retweeter’s personal endorsement, so two users can have similar preferences if they
often retweet the same tweets. Hence, these behavioral footprints may provide strong
evidence beyond who users are connected to (social) and what they post (interests).
In this dissertation we adopt link sharing as a public, observable behavior that may
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serve as a first step toward improving the learning of user topical profiles. Other behav-
ioral footprints are possible, and we anticipate revisiting these in our future work. Link
sharing behavior for topical profiles has received some attention in social media research.
Previous work looked into why and what content people share via links in social media
[71, 69]. Some other work has mentioned the role of link sharing in social spamming
[76]. Through link sharing, users can concisely express their viewpoints, interests, and
professional expertise. For instance, a person who works in the IT industry may usu-
ally post link of engadget.com. A user who likes sports may often share links of
espn.com. In Figure 5.1b, Carol is a political journalist so she regularly posts some
links of huffingtonpost.com, and we see David also usually shares the same links.
In this case we may infer politics-relevant tags for David.
Concretely, let Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zP} be the set of links posted by users. Similar to
the interest footprint, we define C ∈ RN×P as a user-link matrix where C(i, j) is the
frequency of link zj posted by user ui. Also, D ∈ RM×P is a tag-link matrix with D(i, j)
as the frequency of link zj appearing in all posts from users having tag ti. As a result, we
leverage link sharing via the following loss function:
L3 = 1
2
‖C −UGT‖2F +
1
2
‖D − V GT‖2F ,
whereG ∈ RP×K represents link’s latent topical spaces. Our goal is to minimize L3, with
the idea that users may have similar topical profiles if they behave similarly when posting
links.
5.4.2 Learning User Topical Profiles: A 2-D Model
Since evidence from multiple implicit footprints may provide conflicting evidence,
potentially leading to lower quality user profiles than considering footprints in isolation,
we turn in this section to developing a unified model that can integrate all possible het-
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Figure 5.2: An overview of the 2-D model (UTop)
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erogeneous footprints together into a matrix (2-D) completion model. Since all implicit
footprints are modeled as regularization terms in Section 5.4.1, intuitively we can linearly
incorporate them into the proposed UTop model. Again, recall that we focus our presen-
tation here on those three specific footprints (social, interest, behavioral), but the model is
designed to generalize to more alternative footprints as well.
Figure 5.2 gives an overview of UTop. In general, we factorize each of the social,
interest, and behavioral footprint matrices, and assume that the objective user-tag matrix
shares the same latent user dimensions with them. This is the fundamental assumption
in most factorization-based methods for solving matrix completion problems. We also
consider explicit footprints. Similarly, we collect each tag’s latent representation, and
multiply them with each user’s latent factor for estimating the objective matrix.
Concretely, we formulate the following optimization problem as following:
min
U ,V ,W ,G
F = 1
2
‖Ω (X −UV T )‖2F
+
λ
2
(‖A−UW T‖2F + ‖B − VW T‖2F )
+
γ
2
(‖C −UGT‖2F + ‖D − V GT‖2F )
+
δ
2
‖E −UUT‖2F
+
α
2
(‖U‖2F + ‖V ‖2F + ‖W ‖2F + ‖G‖2F )
s. t. U ≥ 0,V ≥ 0,W ≥ 0,G ≥ 0,
(5.2)
where λ, γ, δ and α are positive regularization parameters controlling the contributions
of different implicit footprints. ‖U‖2F , ‖V ‖2F , ‖W ‖2F and ‖G‖2F are deployed to avoid
overfitting. Similar to Equation 5.1, we insert the non-negative constraints for U , V , W ,
and G.
The derivation of the objective function in Eq.(5.2) regarding four variablesU , V ,W
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and G are demonstrated as:
∂F
∂U
=−ΩΩ (X −UV T )V − λ(A−UW T )
− γ(C −UGT )− 2δ(E −UUT ) + αU ,
∂F
∂V
=−ΩT ΩT  (XT − V UT )U − λ(B − VW T )
− γ(D − V GT ) + αV ,
∂F
∂W
=− λ(AT −WUT )U − λ(BT −WV T )V + αW ,
∂F
∂G
=− γ(CT −GUT )U − γ(DT −GV T )V + αG.
(5.3)
Based upon these derivations, we then apply stochastic gradient descent to iteratively
update each variable by taking a step η along its gradient ascending. The algorithm details
are presented in Algorithm 1 in which learning steps ηu, ηv, ηw and ηg are chosen based
upon the Goldstein Conditions [179]. We implement the non-negative constraints on U
andV through forcing their negative values to 0 in each iteration. As shown, this algorithm
considers all three footprints together to estimate the topical profiles for each user.
Algorithm 1: UTop solver
Input: user-tag matrix X , user-word matrix A, tag-word matrix B, user-url matrix
C, tag-url matrix D, user friendship matrix E, observation indication
matrix Ω and parameters {λ, γ, δ, ρ, η}
Output: U ,V
1 Initialize U , V , W and G randomly, t = 0
2 while Not Converged do
3 Compute ∂F
∂U
, ∂F
∂V
, ∂F
∂W
and ∂F
∂G
in Eq.(5.3)
4 Update Ut+1 ← max(Ut − ηu ∂F∂U , 0)
5 Update Vt+1 ← max(Vt − ηv ∂F∂U , 0)
6 Update Wt+1 ← max(Wt − ηw ∂F∂U , 0)
7 Update Gt+1 ← max(Gt − ηg ∂F∂U , 0)
8 t = t+ 1
9 return U and V
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Though unifying all three heterogeneous implicit footprints, this initial UTop approach
has two main drawbacks. First, it will become complex if we introduce additional foot-
prints, as we bring in more controlling parameters of new footprints to be tuned. In addi-
tion, UTop does not take into account the relations between those heterogeneous footprints
which could be jointly explored in the latent space. Given these concerns, can we find a
generalized model that can jointly leverage all potential heterogeneous footprints? We turn
in the following section to answering this question.
5.4.3 Learning User Topical Profiles: A Generalized Model
In this section, we augment UTop with a generalized approach toward jointly exploring
the relationships across footprints for more robust user topical profile learning. First, to
relieve the dramatic increase of parameters when introducing more regularization terms,
we need to replace the linear combination model in UTop by a more compact factoriza-
tion model without manually tuning tradeoff parameters from different new footprints.
Second, such a compact factorization model should consider all possible pairwise interac-
tions between footprints to exploit their multi-linear relationships. Therefore, we adopt a
tensor factorization model which explicitly takes into account the multi-way structure of
data. Moreover, the factorization will only happen once even if we introduce additional
heterogeneous footprints.
Figure 5.3 shows an overview of UTop+. In general, we model all implicit footprints
in one tensor via calculating the user similarity in each footprint space. There can be many
options for measuring the user similarity in every footprint space. We test many of them
and report the one providing the best performance in Section 4.5. Then, we factorize the
tensor and obtain a matrix of latent representations for all users, upon which we extract a
user similarity matrix to estimate the original user-tag matrix.
Concretely, we denote the tensor as C ∈ RN×N×R which is a multidimensional array
106
Us
er
Behaviors
Social
Textual
Us
er
User
Us
er
Latent Dimensions
User Similarity Matrix
Calculate
Similarity
User-Tag Matrix
Figure 5.3: An overview of the generalized model (UTop+)
where R is the number of implicit footprints and N is the size of the user set. We can
factorize the tensor C to one latent user matricesQ ∈ RN×K and one latent context matrix
Y ∈ RR×K , where K is the number of latent dimensions. The tensor factorization is to
solve the optimization problem defined below:
min
Q,Y
1
2
‖C − [[Q,Q,Y ]]‖2F +
α
2
(‖Q‖2F + ‖Y ‖2F ), (5.4)
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where [[Q,Q,Y ]] ∈ RN×N×R is given by
[[Q,Q,Y ]] =
K∑
k=1
qk ◦ qk ◦ yk.
Here qk and yk are the kth column vectors of Q and Y , respectively. To solve Eq.(5.4),
we adopt the existing CPOPT method [180] — a fitting approach for the CP (Canonical-
decomposition / Parallel-factor-analysis (PARAFAC)) model. The latent footprint matrix
Y represents the contribution of each type of footprint to latent dimensions.
The next natural question is how to leverage the new latent space Q of all users. The
basic idea is that two users tend to have similar topical profiles if they have similar latent
representations derived by jointly considering all their implicit footprints. Thus, we first
calculate the user similarity matrix denoted as Ψ computed from latent features of users
Q by the cosine similarity. We can see Q as a “new footprint” and formulate it as the new
loss function:
Θ =
1
2
∑
i,j
Ψ(i, j)‖Ui −Uj‖2
=
∑
i,j
UiΨ(i, j)Ui
T −
∑
i,j
UiΨ(i, j)Uj
T
=
∑
i
UiD(i, i)Ui
T −
∑
i,j
UiΨ(i, j)Uj
T
= tr(UT (D −Ψ)U)
= tr(UTLU),
(5.5)
whereUi is the ith row ofU , tr(· ) denotes the matrix trace, andD is a diagonal matrix in
whichD(i, i) =
∑
j Ψ(i, j), andL = D−Ψ is the graph Laplacian of the user similarity
matrix Ψ.
How can we utilize the new implicit footprint Θ to learn user topical profiles? Simi-
larly, we are able to use Θ to regulate latent representations of two similar users to make
108
them as close as possible. Hence, we can build the generalized UTop+ by solving the
following optimization problem:
min
U ,V
1
2
‖Ω (X −UV T )‖2F +
β
2
tr(UTLU)
+
α
2
(‖U‖2F + ‖V ‖2F ),
s. t. U ≥ 0,V ≥ 0,
(5.6)
where β is the controlling parameter. This optimization problem can be solved similarly
as introduced in Section 5.4.2. The detailed solver is presented in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: UTop+ solver
Input: user-tag matrix X , user-word matrix A, user-url matrix C, user friendship
matrix E, observation indication matrix Ω and parameters {α, β, ηu, ηv}
Output: U ,V
1 Calculate the tensor C from A, C and E
2 Calculate [Q,Y ]← CPOPT(C)
3 Calculate the user similarity matrix Ψ based on Q
4 Construct the graph Laplacian matrix L for Ψ
5 Initialize U and V , randomly, t = 0
6 while Not Converged do
7 Compute ∂F
∂U
= −(ΩΩ)(X −UV T ))V + βLU
8 Compute ∂F
∂V
= −(ΩT ΩT )(XT − V UT ))U
9 Update Ut+1 ← max(Ut − ηu ∂F∂U , 0)
10 Update Vt+1 ← max(Vt − ηv ∂F∂U , 0)
11 t = t+ 1
12 return U and V
In summary, we first present a 2-D model for learning user topical profiles (called
UTop) in which each of three heterogeneous implicit footprints is modeled as regulariza-
tion terms. We provide Algorithm 1 to solve the optimization problem in Equation 5.2.
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Then we extend UTop to a compact generalized model (called UTop+). Based on a tensor
decomposition method, UTop+ can jointly handle relationships across multiple footprints
without introducing new parameters. The complete overview of UTop+ is shown in Fig-
ure 5.3, and we propose Algorithm 2 to solve Equation 5.6.
5.5 Experiments
In this section, we conduct a series of experiments to answer the following questions:
(i) How well do the proposed UTop and UTop+ models work? (ii) Which implicit foot-
prints are most effective? (iii) How does UTop+ compare with other alternatives? Does it
really improve upon the simpler UTop approach? (iv) How do the proposed approaches
compare to other variants?; and (v) What impact do the model parameters have on the
ultimate performance? We begin by introducing the experimental setup including dataset
collection and evaluation method.
5.5.1 Experiment Setup
In this section, we start with describing the data we collect. Next, we introduce the
metrics we use for evaluation. Finally, we provide the details of three baselines, and show
the parameter settings we choose in our proposed models.
Twitter Lists. We adopt Twitter Lists, a large publicly-accessible collection of crowd-
contributed tagging knowledge for social media users. Recall that these lists allow one
user to annotate another with a list name (or tag), e.g., politics, music, art. Via the public
Twitter API, we randomly sample a set of 3.468 million Twitter users, and crawl the list
membership information for each of them. We identify 977,000 users who have ever been
included in some list, but we find a huge amount of noise. For instance, nonsense tags
(like numbers, unicode characters, single letters) take up a major proportion. Many tags
(e.g., “friend”, “love”, and “amigo”) are not reflective of topical profiles. Also, there exist
many near-synonyms and variants such as “writer-author” and “news-noticia”. To obtain
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high-quality tags for our problem, we rank all tags by the number of labeled users, and
manually curate the top-500 tags through merging variants and filtering noise.
Implicit Footprints. For interest footprints, we aggregate all terms each user has posted
and adopt the standard LDA topic model after filtering stopwords and stemming. We fur-
ther measure user similarity by calculating the pairwise Jensen-Shannon divergence. For
social footprints, we crawl the friendship connection information for each user. Following
a user can be quite casual on Twitter, so we focus on mutual followings as the basis of user
similarity in the social footprint space. For behavioral footprints, we aggregate all links a
user has posted in her tweets and obtain the posting counts. We resolve all crawled URLs
(most are shortened) to take care of URL variants, and focus on the URL domain name
which conceptually represents a website. For quantifying similar link sharing patterns, we
test a set of measurements (e.g., intersection, cosine, jaccard) and find the one in [181]
works best.
Users. We collect a set of 72,096 users who have all those three types of implicit footprints
and have been labeled by at least one of the candidate tags. Since many of them have sparse
tagging information, we rank all users by the number of tags they have. We look into the
top 50,000 users, and randomly select 10,000 users for training and evaluation.
In our proposed models, we end up with scores of all candidate tags for each user.
Since we should take those most associated tags as user topical profiles, we rank them in
descending order and focus on the top-k ranked tags. Our evaluation is based on ten-fold
cross validation.
Metrics. We pick several metrics which can cover different evaluation aspects. On the
one side, we would like to see the ratio of correct inferences for learning user topical
profiles. And on the other side, we want to measure the prediction error. Thus, we adopt
precision@k which measures the percentage of correctly estimated top-k tags, and Mean
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Absolute Error (MAE) which quantifies the prediction quality in terms of errors. Note that
a lower MAE means a better performance.
Furthermore, besides the absolute measurement in accuracy, the relative ranking order
is another important perspective, especially in some recommendation scenarios. The rank
correlation coefficients of both Kendall’s τ and Spearman’s ρ are two prevalent metrics
for measuring rank-based agreement across two lists. We use them both to measure the
number of pairs of tags that are correctly ordered from our results. Their values both range
from -1 to 1, with the higher the more relevant.
Baselines. We select three baselines as alternatives to the proposed UTop+ approach. To
be fair, we incorporate all three proposed footprints and maintain the same experimental
setup for all the following approaches:
• Nearest Neighborhood (NN). An intuitive solution is based on the traditional near-
est neighborhood model. A user is modeled by a vector extracting from the corre-
sponding row in the context matrix, i.e., A, C, or E. Then, for each target user, we
separately find a set of closest seed users in each context, and pick the intersected
neighbors from whom we propagate their tags and scores and take the average for
each tag.
• Cross-domain Triadic Factorization (CTF) [172]. This state-of-the-art method
directly combines user ratings of different merchandise (e.g., book, music, movie)
into one tensor model, in which all the values are user ratings. Then, it extends the
existing PARAFAC2 model [182] that transforms heterogeneous user-rating matri-
ces of different lengths into one cubical tensor and factorizes it. Here in our problem
setting, this approach can also be applied on those heterogeneous user-footprint ma-
trices; the subsequent steps follow Equation 5.5 in order to solve Equation 5.6.
• UTop. Introduced in Section 5.4.2, this model is a basic version that considers each
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footprint as a regularization term and linearly adds them together.
Parameter Settings. To determine the number of latent dimensions in both UTop and
UTop+, we experiment with a sequence of settings {5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100} and empir-
ically select 20 for both UTop and UTop+, as a trade-off between accuracy and efficiency.
In Algorithm 1, there are five parameters λ, γ, δ, α, and η. The first four parameters are
used to control the contributions of various footprints. The last one is a step along its
gradient ascending. As is commonly done, we iteratively employ cross-validation to tune
these parameters. Specifically, we empirically set λ = 0.02, γ = 0.7, β = 0.1, α = 0.4
and η = 0.05 for general experiments, respectively. In UTop+, we choose 10 for the num-
ber of latent dimension in tensor factorization. The step size η is set to 0.05. In addition,
two positive parameters α and β in Eq. (5.6) are involved in the experiments. Concretely,
we empirically set α = 0.3 and β = 0.02 via cross-validation.
5.5.2 The Impact of Different Footprints
In general, interest, social, and behavioral footprints have different emphases on user
topical profiles. Hence, which footprints work better (or best) is one of the most com-
pelling questions to answer. Hence, we compare different combinations of all footprints in
both NN and UTop. The reason we do not test them in UTop+ is that the multi-way man-
ner of UTop+ may not clearly tell which footprint contributes more. We show the results
in Table 5.1 in which T is for text-based interest, S is for social, and B is for behavioral.
When individually using each implicit footprint, we find the behavioral footprint (link
sharing) always performs the best in any setting. Moreover, combining it with other foot-
prints always bring the biggest improvement in these experiments. For instance, within the
NN method, the behavioral footprint has up to 24% larger Spearman correlation than the
social footprint. In UTop, the MAE@10 decreases by 8% when the behavioral footprint is
added with the interest footprint. These results indicate the importance of capturing actual
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Table 5.1: The impact of different implicit footprints for learning user topical profiles
Method Precision MAE Kendall’s τ Spearman’s ρTop 5 Top 10 Top 15 Top 5 Top 10 Top 15 Top 5 Top 10 Top 15 Top 5 Top 10 Top 15
NN (T) 0.2113 0.2356 0.2673 0.2914 0.2692 0.2432 0.2460 0.1687 0.1531 0.3054 0.2262 0.1784
NN (S) 0.1920 0.2153 0.2330 0.3048 0.2791 0.2642 0.2110 0.1420 0.1289 0.2670 0.1852 0.1682
NN (B) 0.2423 0.2629 0.3155 0.2650 0.2342 0.2110 0.2826 0.2044 0.1834 0.3314 0.2429 0.2106
UTop (T) 0.3438 0.3791 0.4668 0.2264 0.2069 0.1897 0.3221 0.2464 0.2031 0.4163 0.2987 0.2409
UTop (S) 0.3390 0.3837 0.4561 0.2298 0.2093 0.1887 0.3172 0.2421 0.2003 0.4135 0.2916 0.2341
UTop (B) 0.3556 0.3980 0.4733 0.2275 0.1982 0.1699 0.3286 0.2557 0.2067 0.4302 0.3015 0.2426
UTop (T+S) 0.3494 0.3847 0.4657 0.2300 0.2107 0.1872 0.3205 0.2516 0.2085 0.4189 0.2970 0.2378
UTop (T+B) 0.3587 0.4132 0.4758 0.2193 0.1894 0.1909 0.3329 0.2606 0.2197 0.4348 0.3071 0.2535
UTop (S+B) 0.3544 0.4069 0.4729 0.2238 0.1930 0.1852 0.3272 0.2588 0.2185 0.4322 0.3054 0.2561
UTop (T+S+B) 0.3616 0.4189 0.4931 0.2137 0.1861 0.1772 0.3403 0.2746 0.2267 0.4414 0.3104 0.2682
user behaviors as a critical step for identifying user topical profiles (in contrast, to relying
purely on social connections or on the content of what users post). These results support
the intuition that social footprints may capture spurious user similarities (e.g., linking two
very different users) and that text-based interest footprints may insert noise into learning
user topical profiles. In contrast, behavioral cues provide a clearer perspective on user
interests and expertise.
What if behavioral data is scarce? Link sharing is one of the few publicly-available
sources of behavioral information, but sometimes it can still be a scarce resource because
not all users will share many links on social media. In contrast, social and interest-based
footprints are typically more universally available. We see in Table 5.1 that interest and
social footprints can still work well even without access to behavioral footprints. For
example, in UTop, the interest footprint is only 5% behind behavioral in precision@10,
and the social footprint has just 1% larger MAE@5 than behavioral. These observations
show that our model can still achieve a good performance even when we have scarce
behavioral evidence. But that together, the three different footprints can complement each
other, leading to even better user topical profiles.
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5.5.3 Evaluating UTop and UTop+
Given the evidence of the importance of different footprints, we now turn to evaluating
the two proposed models — UTop and UTop+ — versus alternatives. As we can see in
Figure 5.4, both UTop and UTop+ perform better than the Nearest Neighbor (NN) and the
Cross-domain Triadic Factorization (CTF) across all four evaluation metrics. For preci-
sion@5, UTop+ is 36% and 13% better than NN and CTF with p-values of 0.001 and 0.003
under McNemar’s test, respectively. For MAE@10, UTop+ outperforms NN by 20% with
the p-value of 0.002 and CTF by 11.8% with the p-value of 0.001. The gaps become
even larger for the two ranking correlation coefficients, as we can see in Figure 5.4c and
5.4d. These results suggest that the proposed learning models can better leverage all foot-
prints together than either the neighborhood-based propagation or the immediate tensor
decomposition. Note that the CTF method is fundamentally different from our problem
setting where we cannot simply put together all heterogeneous footprints. In contrast, we
exploit latent factors to build a user similar matrix and find its graph Laplacian as a new
regularization term. We show the effectiveness of this step in Section 5.5.4.
Recall that we introduced UTop+ as an extension to UTop to provide a more compact
factorization and to jointly handle relationships across multiple implicit footprints. In
Figure 5.4 we find UTop+ surpasses UTop in all settings. UTop+ has an improvement
of 4.2% in precision@10, 3% in MAE@5, 5.9% in Kendall correlation@10, and 3.8%
in Spearman correlation@5. These findings indicate that the proposed UTop+ can better
exploit the joint correlations between all heterogeneous footprints for improved learning of
user topical profiles. All these finding are conducted under McNemar’s test with p-values
less than 0.01.
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Figure 5.4: Comparisons between proposed models and alternative baselines
5.5.4 Considering Other Variants
Why We Need Regularization? A natural question is why we need a regularization
model. Why not just put all footprints into one large matrix and directly apply state-of-
the-art matrix factorization methods? To investigate this question, we put them into one
matrix upon which we adopt the standard factorization technique, where we denote such a
method MF. We do normalization for the data of each footprint since their values can have
distinct scales. We follow the same evaluation methodology and show the comparisons
in Figure 5.5. All results are measured at the top-10. We clearly see the proposed UTop
results in better performances than MF in every metric. These results suggest that hetero-
geneous footprints require careful integration, and that the proposed UTop approach is a
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good solution in comparison.
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Figure 5.5: Comparisons between UTop and standard MF
Why We Do Regularization After Tensor Factorization? In UTop+, after having the
latent factors of users from tensor factorization, we build a user similar matrix and find
its graph Laplacian as the new regularization term. Why not just directly replace the
user’s latent matrix U in X after factorizing the tensor? We call such a scheme Tensor
Factorization-based Matrix Factorization (TFMF), and we show the comparison results
in Figure 5.6 for all metrics at top 10. Our UTop+ outperforms TFMF in all settings
(e.g., 68% precison, 38% MAE, 45% Kendall correlation). These outcomes show that
regularization after tensor factorization can significantly improve the performance.
Impact of Parameters. Finally, two critical parameters in UTop+ are α and β. Recall
that α is used to avoid overfitting; β is to control the contribution of the user similarity
derived from three types of footprints. In order to better understand the impacts of these
two parameters, we evaluate the performance of UTop+ across various parameter settings.
We vary values of these parameters in [0.001 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10] and present the results of
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Figure 5.6: Comparisons between UTop+ and TFMF
precision and Kendall’s τ in Figure 5.7 for learning the top-10 tags. As we can see, UTop+
achieves relatively consistent performance across a wide range. Particularly, we find the
setting α = 0.1 and β = 0.01 gives the best performance. These results indicate the
stability of UTop+ to these parameters.
5.6 Summary
Mining user topical profiles (e.g., user interests and expertise) has important appli-
cations in diverse domains such as personalized search and recommendation, as well as
expert detection. We tackled the problem of learning user topical profiles. In particular,
we investigated how to leverage user-generated information in heterogeneous and diverse
footprints. Concretely, we proposed UTop+ — a generalized model that integrates mul-
tiple implicit footprints with explicit footprints for learning high-quality user topical pro-
files. By taking into account pairwise relations among multiple footprints, the proposed
UTop+ intelligently combines the potential benefits of each footprint to find the best ev-
idence across footprints for learning high-quality user profiles. And indeed, extensive
experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of UTop+. For instance, it surpasses other al-
ternatives up to 36% in precision@5 and 20% in MAE@10. Link sharing, as one type
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Figure 5.7: Impact of α and β on UTop+
of publicly-accessible user behavior, brings better results than other implicit footprints in
every evaluation setting. Moreover, compared with other variants in terms of modeling,
our model also has the best performance, e.g., up to 68% for precision@10 and Kendall
correlation@10.
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6. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
This chapter concludes this dissertation with a summary of the contributions and high-
lighting some future directions for continued research.
6.1 Summary of This Dissertation
Social media facilitates user’s self-expression and information spread like never be-
fore. Massive user behavior information are generated everyday on social media through
varying user activities there. Unfortunately, many social media platforms have become
breeding grounds for user misbehavior. In this dissertation we focus on three specific
threads of user misbehaviors that commonly exist on social media — spamming, manip-
ulation, and distortion. Toward tackling these misbehaviors we look into one concrete
application for each misbehavior.
We first address the challenge of detecting spam links, which is an important task for
shielding users from links associated with phishing, malware, and other low-quality, sus-
picious content. Rather than rely on traditional blacklist-based filters or content analysis
of the landing page, we examine the behavioral factors of both who is posting the link
and who is clicking on the link. The core intuition is that these behavioral signals may be
more difficult to manipulate than traditional signals. Concretely, we propose and evaluate
fifteen click and posting-based features. Through extensive experimental evaluation, we
find that this purely behavioral approach can achieve high precision (0.86), recall (0.86),
and area-under-the-curve (0.92), suggesting the potential for robust behavior-based spam
link detection.
Next we uncover manipulated behavior of link sharing on social media. We investigate
the individual-based and group-based user behavior pattern of link sharing toward organic
versus organized user groups. Concretely, we propose a four-phase approach to model,
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identify, characterize, and classify organic and organized groups who engage in link shar-
ing. The key motivating insights of this approach are (i) that patterns of individual-based
behavioral signals embedded in link posting activities can uncover groups whose members
engage in similar behaviors; and (ii) that group-level behavioral signals can distinguish
between organic and organized user groups. Through extensive experiments, we find that
levels of organized behavior vary by link type and that the proposed approach achieves
good performance – an F-measure of 0.836 and Area Under the Curve of 0.921.
Finally we investigate a particular distortion behavior: posting BS on social media.
Many case studies indicate that BS affects our government, news, health, advertising,
as well as our social media. Because of the volume of content and the nuance of BS
identification, building an auto-detector of BS on social media is extremely challenging
and has not been extensively explored. We explore the factors impacting the perception
of BS on social media and what leads users to ultimately perceive and call a post BS.
We begin by preparing a reasonable, crowd-sourced collection of tweets that have been
called BS. We then build a post level classification model that can determine what posts
are more likely to be called BS. Our experiments suggest our classifier has the potential of
leveraging linguistic cues for detecting social media posts that are likely to be called BS.
We believe our work can serve as a stepping-stone to the ultimate goal of automated BS
detection.
Each of these applications has its own scope in the context of user misbehavior, but
user is the cross-cutting subject. Knowing the profiles of users can shed light into what
subjects each user is associated with, which can benefit the understanding of the connec-
tion between user and misbehavior.
Therefore, we study a fourth task of learning social media user’s topical profile —
interests (i.e., what she likes) or expertise (i.e., what she is known for). It serves as a cross-
cutting component toward better understanding those applications of user misbehavior.
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User interests and expertise are valuable but often hidden resources on social media. To
solve this problem, our main idea is to intelligently learn user topical profiles by exploiting
information from multiple, heterogeneous footprints. We propose a unified model for
learning user topical profiles that simultaneously considers multiple footprints. We show
how these footprints can be embedded in a generalized optimization framework that takes
into account pairwise relations among all footprints for robustly learning user profiles.
Through extensive experiments, we find the proposed model is capable of learning high-
quality user topical profiles, and leads to a 10-15% improvement in precision and mean
average error versus a cross-triadic factorization state-of-the-art baseline.
6.2 Future Work
This dissertation can be extended along two thrusts in the future:
• Thrust 1: Exploiting User Topical Profiles for Combating User Misbehavior.
In Figure 1.1 we have shown four problems studied in this dissertation — three
threads of user misbehavior and a cross-cutting component related to user profile.
In previous chapters we have presented our detailed solution for each of those four
problems, mainly focusing on the patterns of misbehavior without emphasizing the
user profile. Thus, one future direction is to introduce the cross-cutting component
toward better combating those three user misbehaviors.
In particular, we are interested in intelligently exploiting the learned user topical
profiles for better solving those three applications. First, besides the behavioral sig-
nals (posting and clicking) explored in Section 2, we will incorporate user’s topical
profile into a model of detecting spam links. For example, those links posted by
a user whose topical profiles associate with low-quality content (such as ads and
virus) will become more suspicious in the new model. Second, for identifying ma-
nipulated link sharing behavior we will consider the user’s group-level affinity of
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both sharing pattern and topical profile. For instance, for a group of users who share
many same politics related links, we tend to have more evidence that these users are
in a political campaign if we find the topical profiles of these users are all politics
based. Thirdly, the learned user topical profile can also benefit BS identification.
Recall that BS is a claim where the poster does not care if his claim is true or false,
but rather uses the post as a story to some other effect. Hence, the learned topical
profiles of a user can shed light into this user’s knowledge domains, which can help
judging whether this user makes BS statement in many circumstances.
• Thrust 2: Automated BS Detection. In Section 5 we build a system that automat-
ically determines what social media posts are likely to be called BS. As discussed,
this is our initial attempt toward building a BS auto-detector on social media. It can
serve as a stepping-stone to the ultimate goal of automated BS detection.
In concrete, we will continue our work through several avenues. First, we will
temporally (considering a longer collection duration) and spatially (e.g., broadening
to the whole world) extend our dataset. Second, we will incorporate more indicators
to help us better characterize BS (when and where a post has been called as BS).
Third, we will keep looking for existing related models from other disciplines (like
philosophy and sociology) and explore whether they can be applied in our problem
setting. Finally, we will pursue formally modeling of the motivation of BS-ing and
BS calling, i.e. why some people are keen on saying or calling BS on social media.
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